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(i) 
COSTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
SUMMARY 
The study evaluates the conceptual and measurement problems 
involved in estimating the costs of unemployment for the Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. Different methods 
are used to estimate the output loss costs and are found to be over ten 
percent of GDP. The fiscal costs are estimated to be of the order of 
about five percent of GDP. The costs to the individual (financial, 
physical and mental health) are judged to be very serious and get worse 
with duration of unemployment. The social costs (increased mortality, 
crime) are reckoned to be important. The study concludes by suggesting 
policies for a coordinated reflation as well as various job creation 
measures. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary 
1.1 Introduction 
In the past few years unemployment has grown rapidly and reached post 
war record levels in most of the European countries. The total registered 
unemployment in the European Community in July 1985 was 12.5 millions 
(approximately) while the total in the big four countries (Federal Republic 
of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom) was 10.6 millions. This 
report looks at the costs of this unemployment in terms of output loss, fiscal 
costs and individual and social costs. The aim of this report is to provide 
some quantitative estimates of the output loss costs, the fiscal (exchequer) 
costs and the financial costs to the individual. In addition the report 
looks at some studies on the costs to the individual in terms of mental and 
physical health and the costs to society in terms of morbidity, mortality 
and crime. 
In this report an underlying assumption is that a large proportion of 
the unemployment is involuntary and that economic policies can be devised 
to reduce the level of unemployment. In carrying out our estimation of the 
costs of unemployment we have relied on published statistical sources 
(Eurostat and OECD and some national sources) and we discuss the limitations 
of the data on unemployment in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we discuss broad 
analytical issues involved in evaluating the costs of unemployment. In 
particular, we list a whole range of costs (and potential benefits) of 
unemployment and suggest that it is difficult to aggregate them into a 
single measure. In Chapter 4 we discuss alternative methods of estimating 
the real costs of unemployment in the output loss costs. The alternative 
methods are: the average product, average wage, trend and Okun's law methods. 
To provide these estimates, we have to make one critical assumption: do we 
assume unemployment can be brought down to zero or to some other level? 
We assume that unemployment is brought down to the average levels of 1968-73 
or 1974-79. We provide estimates for each different method mentioned above. 
Chapter 5 discusses the problems involved in estimating the costs of 
unemployment to the Government in terms of its expenditures and revenues: the 
fiscal (or Exchequer) costs. Besides the actual expenditures on various 
unemployment compensation schemes, the Government loses in terms of direct 
and indirect taxes because unemployed people do not earn an income and 
spend less than usual. Various assumptions need to be made, in particular, 
the earnings if the unemployed were working. Chapter 6 is a wideranging 
one which looks at the financial costs to the individual (in terms of lost 
income net of unemployment benefits), the mental and physical health 
problems associated with unemployment and finally the costs to society in 
terms of morbidity, mortality and crime. Chapter 7 concludes the report 
with the constraints on economic policies and a brief discussion of policy 
issues. 
The report has been produced in the space of nine months and, in an 
attempt to cover four countries and several different issues, we are sure to 
have been superficial and perhaps made some mistakes. I have been 
assisted in the work for this report by Dr Sue Bowden and am grateful to her 
for her help. I have had help from Dr. Maureen Pike, Mr Mike Rosser, 
Mr Mark Conaty and Dr Mono Chatterji. They are not responsible for the 
remaining errors. Various people in Continental European countries helped 
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in making this report possible: Dr. Robert Salais, INSEE, Paris; Dr. E 
Spitznagel, Institute for Employment Research, Nürnberg; Dr. B.Reissert, 
Institute of Management and Labour Market Policy, Berlin; Dr. Paolo Garonna, 
University of Padua; Professor E. Pugliesi, University of Napoli. None 
of them has seen the report and are clearly exonerated from any mistakes 
or prejudices in the report. 
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1.2 Summary 
1.2.1 I n t r o d u c t i o n 
1.2.2 Growth of Unemployment 
After a brief discussion of the peculiarities of the labour market 
and some explanations of the growth of unemployment, the Chapter reviews 
the evidence on various aspects of growth of unemployment, including 
participation rates, long term and youth unemployment. Finally, it 
discusses some problems with published statistics on unemployment and 
provides some estimates of unregistered or 'hidden' unemployment 
1.2.3 Analytical Framework 
This is a wide ranging chapter that outlines the costs of unemployment 
in terms of lost output, costs to the Government and costs to the individual 
and why Governments may ignore these costs of unemployment. It argues that 
to evaluate the costs of unemployment we need to specify all the costs and 
all the benefits (and who bears the costs and who benefits) and then to find 
some way of quantifying and aggregating these into some social welfare 
function. However, since there is no agreement about an appropriate social 
welfare function, we simply list the costs. To obtain quantitative 
estimates we need to specify what caused the unemployment to rise, how 
this unemployment is to be lowered (i.e. what policies are employed and, 
finally, what is the target rate (level) of unemployment. A few comments 
are made about the inappropriateness of the concept of the 'natural' rate 
of unemployment. 
1.2.4 Real Costs of Unemployment: Output loss 
After a discussion of the economic costs in terms of static and 
dynamic (i.e. short term and long term) losses of output due to unemploy­
ment, we discuss some of the measurement problems. Alternative methods of 
estimating this loss are discussed (a) average product method, i.e. 
ascribing to the unemployed the average product of the employed worker; 
(b) average wage method, using the average earnings as an index of the 
average productivity (strictly speaking as an estimate of marginal 
productivity); (c) trend method, postulating an exponential trend in the 
growth of output and ascribing the deviations from this trend to the 
unemployment and (d) Okun's law method which relates the gap (differences 
between potential and actual output, GDP) to unemployment. Two arbitrary 
levels of unemployment were assumed: average levels of 1968-73 and Λ 
1974-79. A summary of these results is given in Table 1.1. 
These results provide evidence for a substantial real economic cost 
of unemployment. The final part of the chapter discusses some qualifications. 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Notes : 
FRG 
Low High 
1.90 4.41 
4.51 ' 7.18 
8.24 10.91 
11.00 13.71 
1. Based on ' 
­ 4 ­
Table 1.1 
Output Loss Costs 
France Italy UK 
Low 
4.24 
6.77 
8.45 
9.91 
High 
6.74 
9.34 
11.00 
12.50 
 
Low 
2.84 
5.68 
8.22 
.0.95 
■l  
High 
4.24 
7.15 
9.75 
12.53 
Low High 
3.50 
8.11 
9.91 
10.71 
5.15 
9.83 
11.65 
12.46 
2. These are 'average' estimates, as percentages of GDP. 
3. 'Low' refers to bringing unemployment to 1974­79 levels and 
'high' refers to 1968­73 unemployment levels. 
1.2.5 Fiscal (Exchequer) Costs 
The fiscal costs of unemployment are the additional expenditures by 
the Government due to unemployment (e.g. on unemployment benefits, supple­
mentary benefits, free school meals, rate and rent rebates etc.) as well as 
the decreased revenues collected from national insurance (social security) 
contributions and from income (direct) and sales (indirect) taxes. After 
a discussion of the methodology and assumptions made, estimates are provided 
for the big Four. A summary of results is provided below in Table 1.2. 
FRG France Italy UK 
Table 
Fiscal 
4.5 
5.8 
6.5 
6.5 
1. .2 
Costs 
2.3 
3.0 
3.4 
3.4 
1980 ­ 3.3 
1981 ­ 4.9 
1982 2.8 5.7 
1983 3.3 5.5 
Notes: 1. Based on Tables 5.1, 5.2, 5.4 and 5.5 
2. Figures for UK are for 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83, 1983/84. 
It is argued that these are underestimates since they include only first­
round effects and ignore the effects of a Keynesian multiplier. In any case, 
they suggest that policies to stimulate the economy would have a much smaller 
net public finance cost because of these fiscal costs. 
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1.2.6 Individual and Social Costs 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the financial costs of 
unemployment to the individual. It outlines the problems of estimating these 
costs because unemployment benefits vary according to various individual 
characteristics (e.g. employment history, marital status etc.) In addition 
net earnings are affected by tax deductions which are also affected by 
individual characteristics. The concept of a replacement ratio (the ratio 
of unemployment benefits to net earnings) is defined and various versions 
of this are discussed. Other financial costs are the lower future incomes 
that an unemployed person is likely to receive. Estimates of Replacement 
Ratios (RR) are provided and a summary is provided below. 
Table 1.3 
Individual Costs: Replacement Ratios, 1982 
Percent 
Single Person 
68.0 
90.0 
42.2 
26.0 
FRG 
France 
Italy 
UK 
S ource: 
Married 
Tables 6 
Man with 3 Dependents 
.1 
75.0 
90.0 
47.0 
47.0 
and 6.2 
It is argued that there are a range of RRs and, it is difficult to define 
a 'typical' RR. However, it is clear that there are substantial financial 
costs to the individual. In addition employed individuals also suffer 
from the existence of unemployment. 
The next section discusses the psychologically and physically demora­
lising effect of unemployment on individuals. Reviewing the evidence it 
is argued that employment provides a structure to the day and social life 
of an individual: unemployment is disruptive. Unemployment leads to 
increased morbidity and increases the probability of mortality. These 
results are tentative and require further longitudinal studies. A final 
section reviews the costs to society in terms of time series evidence on the 
associaton of unemployment and mortality and unemployment and crime. It 
is argued that unemployment may lead to social strife and civil riots. 
1.2.7 Conclusions 
The report emphasises that the costs of unemployment are very high and 
recommends policies to stimulate the economy. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 1 
1. Source: Eurostat Unemployment 7/85 (20 August 1985) 
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Chapter 2 The Growth of Unemployment 
2. 1 Introduction 
This Chapter reviews some of the evidence on the growth of unemploy­
ment in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. There has been a rapid growth in unemployment since 19 79 in 
almost all the EEC countries with one of the biggest increases in the U.K. 
The international recession (perhaps sparked off by the second oil price 
shock followed by restrictive Government monetary and fiscal policies) 
has led to a decline in employment, in participation rates and a dramatic 
increase in youth unemployment and in long term unemployment. Discussions 
about the functioning of the labour market lie at the centre of controversy 
in Macroeconomic theory. 
It is important to remember that the labour market is very special: 
it is unlike any other market in the economy. Firstly, there are several 
labour markets differentiated by region, skill, occupation, age, industry, 
gender, race etc. In one view, the labour market is segmented into 
'primary' (highly paid, security of tenure, etc.) and 'secondary' (poorly 
paid, short term contracts with frequent spells of unemployment in between) 
markets^). In recent literature similar concepts are referred to as 
'insiders' and 'outsiders' in the labour market^). Secondly, labour 
markets have several forms of institutional constraints: trade unions, 
agreed wage bargaining procedure, minimum wage legislation, equal rights 
legislation, Factory Acts, employment protection legislation and 
general social conventions or custom' ' . 
There are three main explanations of the growth of unemployment: 
(i) the neoclassical school who argue that labour markets have 
institutional rigidities (especially in real wages) which prevent 
labour market clearing. It is argued that the oil price shock 
led to rapid- growth of unemployment because real wages did not 
adjust quickly, e.g. due to the pressure of unions, minimum 
wage legislation, employment protection, high social security 
benefits, etc. 
(ii) The Keynesian school who argue that the growth of unemployment 
has been caused by inadequate aggregate demand (perhaps 
triggered by the oil shock) which was aggravated by tight 
monetary and fiscal policy. 
(iii) the radical school who argue that structural and technological 
change leads to increasing unemployment. 
In recent years there has been a growth of the New Classical school 
who argue that all unemployment is voluntary and due to misperceptions. 
To obtain estimates of the Costs of Unemployment we have to assume 
that unemployment (or a part of it) is involuntary and that 'appropriate' 
Government policies can help to reduce unemployment levels. This is 
discussed further in the next Chapter. 
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2.2 The Evidence 
The worsening of the labour market is reflected in a decline in 
employment, participation rates, average hours worked and, of course, 
a rise in unemployment. Before we present some statistics, it is worth 
noting that it is very difficult to make cross-country comparisons 
due to differences in definitions, in institutional practices, etc. 
Even comparisons over time are sometimes misleading due to changes in 
(say) data collection methods, or changes in legislation. We have 
relied on OECD data which makes an attempt to standardise definitions. 
Table 2.1 illustrates changes in the Employment Population ratios 
(total employment divided by population of working age, 15-64 years). 
Employmen 
1975 
Federal Republic 65.2 
of Germany 
France 64.5 
Italy 55.5 
U.K. 71.4 
Table 
t Popu: 
1979 
64.6 
64.0 
55.8 
71.0 
2.1 
lation Rat 
1980 
64.4 
63.3 
56.4 
70.6 
a 
ios 
1981 
63.0 
62.1 
56.2 
67.0 
1982 
61.1 
61.4 
55.3 
65.6 
1983b 
59.4 
60.6 
54.7 
64.6 
Notes a. Defined as total employment divided by population of 
working age (15-64) 
b. Secretariat Estimates 
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1984 
The impact of the recession can be clearly seen in the fall of 
these ratios for each country. However, these do not reflect the fall 
in full time working as there has been a rapid growth of part-time 
working, especially amongst wornen^) . The differences across countries 
may reflect differences in educational opportunities (or policies), 
for example a smaller proportion of the school-leaving age group stay 
on in higher education in Britain compared to other EEC countries. 
The low Italian ratios may reflect the larger informal sector in the 
economy. However, the trends are clearly downward in each case except 
for Italy where it is a very gentle trend. 
A similar picture emerges if we look at the participation rates, 
see Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.2 
Participation Rates 
19 75 19 79 1980 1981 1982 1983b 
67.3 
58.9 
73.8 
67.9 
60.3 
74.5 
67.6 
60.9 
74.8 
67.0 
61.3 
73.6 
66.7 
60.7 
73.2 
65.9 
60.6 
72.7 
Federai Republic 67.9 66.8 66.6 66.1 65.4 64.7 
of Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
Notes a. Defined as total labour force divided by population of 
working age (15-64) at mid year 
b. Secretariat Estimates 
Source: 0ECD Employment Outlook 1984 
These participation rates again reflect a gentle downward trend. 
However, the male participation rates fall faster, while female rates 
fall except for a middle age range. Participation rates for older male 
workers have fallen significantly over the recession. Total employment 
fell in the Federal Republic of Germany, France and the U.K. but rose 
slightly in Italy. However, industrial employment fell in all countries 
with a dramatic fall in the U.K. (almost 6% per annum from 1979-1982). 
These falls in industrial employment were offset partially by a growth 
in the Services sector (of mainly part-time female employment). 
The dramatic rises in unemployment rates over this recession are 
illustrated in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 
Unemployment Rates 
1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
Federal Republic 3.6 3.2 3.0 4.4 6.1 8.0 8.6 
of Germany 
France 4.1 5.9 6.3 7.3 8.0 8.0 9.7 
Italy 5.8 7.6 7.5 8.3 8.9 9.7 10.2 
U.K. 4.6 5.6 6.9 10.6 12.3 13.1 13.2 
Notes a. Standardised Unemployment Rates 
Source: 0ECD Employment Outlook 1984 and Economic Outlook 
June 1985. 
As this has been one of the deepest and longest recessions since 
the 1930s there has been an enormous increase in long term unemployment. 
F.R.G. 
France 
U.K. 
Long Term Unemp 
1979 
a 
39.9 
55.1 
39.7 
b 
19.9 
30.3 
24.5 
loymen 
— 10 -
Table 2.4 
t (Percentage 
1980 
a 
36.2 
56.1 
34.2 
b 
17.0 
32.6 
19.0 
of Total Unemployme: 
1981 
a 
38.1 
55.8 
45.7 
b 
16.2 
32.5 
21.6 
1982 
a 
46.4 
66.5 
54.6 
b 
21.2 
39.8 
33.3 
nt) 
1983 
a b 
54.1 28.5 
67.3 42.6 
57.8 36.2 
Notes: a. 6 months and over 
b. 12 months and over 
c. Source: 0ECD Employment Outlook 1984 
These are data on what are called incompleted durations. It is clear 
from this table that, as the recesssion has continued, the long term 
unemployment problem has worsened. In fact these statistics underestimate 
the true figures because, in many States, especially in France and the U.K. 
older people who have been unemployed for a certain length of time are given 
early retirement so that they disappear from the unemployment statistics. 
Another worrying aspect of this recession has been a very rapid increase 
in youth unemployment (less than 25 years old) and long term unemployment 
amongst youths. This is illustrated in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
Youth Unemployment 
1979 
3.4 
13.3 
25.6 
10.6 
1980 
3.9 
15.0 
25.2 
14.1 
1981 
6.5 
17.0 
27.4 
18.1 
a 
1982 
9.6 
20.2 
29.7 
23.1 
1983 
10.8 
21.0 
32.0 
23.2 
1984 
10.1 
26.1 
34.1 
21.8 
Notes: a. Percentage of total youth labour force 
b. Source: 0ECD Employment Outlook 1984. 
There have been several labour market policies targeted at young people 
and, but for these policies, the youth unemployment problem would have been 
much worse. In spite of these policies, youth (less than 25 years) unemploy­
ment as a proportion of total unemployment was, in July 1985, 24.7%, 36.6%, 
46.2% and 38.7% in the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy and the 
U.K. respectively^ . 
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2.3 Some Measurement Problems 
In the previous section we provided statistics compiled by the OECD 
based on official definitions and on published national statistics. However, 
for several reasons the published data, especially on Unemployment are 
seriously inadequate. These limitations are discussed below: 
(i) France(6) 
The increase in unemployment would have been faster without the intro­
duction of important legislative changes (e.g. UNEDIC) that led to the 
withdrawal of a substantial number of older people from the labour force. 
Various early retirement schemes in the 1980s led to 420,000 receiving 
special income supplements while only 250,000 were working of the 60-64 
age group in March 1982. The retirement age was lowered to 60 in March 1982 
so that in 1983, almost half of the 60-64 age group was outside the labour 
force either under the Income Support scheme or the general old age pension 
arrangements. 
In an attempt to alleviate unemployment, several youth training and 
apprenticeship schemes were introduced, e.g. the community work scheme 
(Travaux d'Utilité Collective). These schemes lead to a decline in unemploy­
ment as long as the employers do not simply substitute these new trainees 
for normal workers. 
Another reason for the inadequacy of the unemployment data is the 
growth of part-time working, especially amongst women. Over half of the 
employment created in France between 1973 and 1983 consisted of part-time 
work mainly amongst women. To what extent this reflects voluntary desire 
for part-time work and to what extent it is involuntary part-time unemploy­
ment is difficult to estimate. 
(ii) Federal Republic of Germany 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Institute for Labour Market 
Policy (IAB, Nürnberg) publishes a time series on the hidden unemployed 
(Stille Reserve). The hidden unemployed include heterogeneous groups like 
housewives, people who took early retirement, those on various job creation 
schemes, etc. These estimates are given below in Table 2. 
Table 2.6 
Estimates of Hidden Unemployment (000s) 
Registered Unemployment Hidden Unemployment Total 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Source Mi 11AB 4/84 
876 
889 
1272 
1833 
2258 
2270 
p. 437 
634 
622 
748 
950 
1181 
1349 
1510 
1511 
2020 
2783 
3439 
3619 
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The estimates of the hidden unemployed are very high: for example, in 
1984 they are about 60 percent of the registered unemployment. 
(iii) Italy(8) 
The statistics on Italian unemployment are seriously inadequate for two 
main reasons: firstly because of the existence of the Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni (CIG) and secondly because of employment in the informal sector. 
Under the CIG workers in manufacturing industries who are "temporarily" 
stopped, receive 80 percent of their regular gross earnings. Workers 
have their hours worked reduced (sometimes even to zero) and figures are 
published on hours "liquidated" by CIG. This makes it difficult to 
estimate the precise effect on the unemployment figures in terms of 
persons. Using a simple full time equivalent idea of 50 weeks and 40 hours 
per week, we can derive some estimates. 
Table 2.7 
The Effect of Cassa Integrazione 
Full Time Equivalent 
Workers (000s) 
102.8 
122.5 
249.8 
281.7 
345.5 
400 
Guadagni 
Change in Unemployment 
% 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
1.2 
1.5 
1.7 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
Source: Rosser (1985) 
It is, by its very nature, difficult to get accurate estimates of 
employment in the informal sector. Some estimates put employment in this 
sector at about 25% of the workforce and producing 25% of GNP.' However, 
there is a high level of double job holding and many of those who work in 
the informal sector also have employment in the formal sector. Many of the 
jobs in the informal sector are precarious and part-time so that the 
official estimates of unemployment may not give such an inaccurate picture. 
(iv) U.K. 
The statistics on U.K. unemployment, it is argued, underestimate the 
real unemployment for various reasons. Since 1982 the published figures 
only include those people who are claiming unemployment (or other) benefits. 
It is estimated that this leads to an under-estimate of approximately 200,000. 
In addition, since 1981, men over 60 years who had been unemployed for 
more than a year were offered high rates of benefits if they took early 
retirement. Since 1983 for certain, men over 60 years were removed from the 
register and early retired. These are estimated to reduce the unemployment 
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figures by about 200,000. Married women, who are often not eligible for 
unemployment or supplementary benefits, are also excluded from the 
unemployment count; this number is estimated to be about 300,000. Some 
people argue that young people on various training schemes should also be 
counted as unemployed. This is a more controversial suggestion. However, 
if we made a correction for all these "missing" groups, the unemployment 
total would be increased by upwards of 750,000(9). 
There is unlikely to be any 'agreed' estimates of this hidden 
unemployment. However, the Unemployment Unit in the U.K., in their 
Statistical Supplement for July 1985 have the real unemployment to be at 
least 400,000 more than the registered unemployment. This is simply by 
making an estimate for registered unemployment on the old basis as opposed 
to the new basis of claimant unemployment (i.e. those claiming some benefits) 
If some allowance is made for those young people on training schemes, the 
Department of Employment estimate that 425,000 were removed from the 
Unemployment totals. 
There are no accepted or well established time series estimates of the 
hidden unemployed in the U.K. so we have not used these estimates in our 
calculations in the rest of this report. However, it is clear that the 
official statistics are an underestimate of the true unemployment level in 
the U.K. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, we discussed very briefly some of the reasons for the 
rapid growth of unemployment in the EEC. The evidence, based on published 
official sources, show a dramatic worsening of the labour market with 
soaring unemployment rates and a frightening growth in youth and long term 
unemployment(ICO . We argued that, for several reasons, published official 
figures were an underestimate of the true unemployment problem. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 2 
1. See Piore (1979) 
2. See OxfordReview of Economic Policy Vol. 1. No. 2, Summer 1985. 
3. See Akerlof (1980) and Solow (1980). 
4. See OECD Employment Outlook, 1983. 
5. Source: Eurostat Unemployment 7, 1985 
6. See OECD Economic Surveys : France, July 1985. 
7. The Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at Nürnberg has done much 
work on this and this discussion is based on it. 
8. This discussion is based on an unpublished paper by M. Rosser (1985) 
prepared especially for this project. 
9. Based on an article in the Observer (16. Sept. 1985) about a Labour 
Party report. 
10. Figures for Great Britain provide food for thought: in April 1985, 
1,273,000 people were unemployed for more than one year (40% of the total 
unemployed), 750,000 for more than two years (24% of the total unemployed) 
and 458,000 for more than three years (15% of the total unemployed). 
(Source: MSC Labour Market Quarterly Report: Great Britain, May 1985). 
Because of legislative changes, many older unemployed people are taken 
off the register and, hence, the duration figures given above are 
underestimates of the true picture. 
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Chapter 3. Analytical Framework 
3. 1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we shall discuss some of the analytical problems 
involved in evaluating the costs of unemployment. The costs of unemployment 
are economic, social and political. These costs are borne (to differing 
extents) by individuals (both unemployed and employed), by their families, 
by social groups or classes, by the Government and, of course, society in 
general. The economic costs faced by the individual depend on.whether (s)he 
is employed or unemployed. If the individual is employed, the overall level 
of unemployment may affect the increases in (real) earnings as well as 
decreasing the probability of moving to better paid or more satisfying 
employment. For the unemployed person the economic costs are obviously the 
loss of income (less any social security benefits). The economic costs to 
society are the loss of potential output both in the current period (static 
costs) and in the future (dynamic costs). The economic costs to the 
Government involve the extra social security payments plus the loss of tax 
revenue due to lower incomes and expenditure. The social (psychological) 
costs to the individual are the loss of status and esteem for the unemployed 
person while the social costs to society are due to increased social tension, 
civil strife, increased crime, morbidity and mortality. The social and 
political costs to groups (classes) are in altering the balance of power 
(both in industrial relations and in the political process) away from workers 
towards the employers (capitalists). Governments may find that their 
political base is eroded by growing unemployment and may be forced to alter 
course. 
Underlying all these aspects is the implicit (sometimes explicit) 
belief that the levels of unemployment currently faced by the European 
Community are avoidable. It is assumed and, in our opinion, this is valid, 
that an alternative set of social and economic policies can generate more 
employment (and hence decrease unemployment) and lead to a growth of 
national income. If this is true, why do Governments not take appropriate 
action to stimulate the economy and reduce unemployment? The answer to this 
question is, in a sense, trite: they do not think any policies they can 
feasibly introduce would lead to an improvement of society as they perceive 
it. A deeper answer to this question, however, must require an answer to 
the question why do they perceive that no improvement can be made? The 
ostensible answer to this is that any policy measures that the Government 
can feasibly enact would lead to a growth in the rate of inflation and 
this is (so it is argued) such an overwhelming social evil that society 
(and, of course, the individuals who make up that Society) must suffer the 
unemployment. Another reason may be that intermittent bouts of unemployment 
are necessary to engender a 'suitable' industrial relations environment 
to be able to obtain a pliable workforce that does not demand higher and 
higher wages, hence threatening the profit rate. If wages increased 
too rapidly, profit rates would fall and hence industrial investment would 
be adversely affected.(1) In recent years there has been a growth of the 
"New Classical" school of Economics which claims that if all people have 
"rational expectations" and markets adjust instantaneously, then the 
Government cannot influence the level of economic activity, employment or 
unemp1oyment Λ ¿ ' The existence of unemployment is a voluntary choice and 
hence not a cost to society. 
The remainder of this Chapter will discuss Social Welfare and the 
Natural Rate of Unemployment. 
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3.2 Social Welfare 
In evaluating the costs of unemployment we need to aggregate the various 
costs and benefits of running an economy with a certain level of unemployment. 
In fact many of the costs and benefits are difficult (if not impossible) to 
quantify. However, even if we could obtain a numerical estimate for the differ­
ent costs and benefits, it is not clear how these should be 'weighted' to 
obtain some aggregate measure of the costs of unemployment. Let us enumerate 
the different costs and benefits: 
(a) Current Output loss (static costs); 
(b) Future Output loss (dynamic costs); 
(c) Costs to the unemployed individual (loss of income minus social 
security benefits, loss of future income because of decreased 
probability of obtaining a future job); 
(d) Costs to the unemployed individual (increased morbidity - illness, 
increased probability of mortality, psychological costs); 
(e) Costs to the employed individual (lower rate of increase of 
wages/earnings); 
(f) Costs to employed individual (increased amount of labour services 
extracted because of the threat of losing one's job, decreased 
job mobility leading to dissatisfaction); 
(g) Costs to the family of unemployed individuals (both monetary and 
social - psychological stress, arguments, separation/divorce); 
(h) Costs to the Government Revenue Department (Exchequer) (higher 
social security payments, less taxes collected from lower incomes 
and lower expenditure); 
(i) Costs for society (greater social tension, strife, crime etc.); 
(j) Costs (benefits?) to society in terms of changed balance of 
power between workers and capitalists (weakening of trade union 
power); 
(k) Benefits of lower rates of inflation; , . 
(1) Benefits of leisure to an unemployed individual ; 
(m) Benefits of a revitalised capitalist economy by weeding out of 
inefficient firms and helping the concentration of economic 
power; and 
(n) Macroeconomic effects on earnings and investment of large Government 
expenditures on social security and declining tax revenues. 
Clearly this is a· wide range of costs and benefits to try to estimate 
and in many cases, they would be impossible to quantify. Even if we could 
quantify each of them we would have to avoid an element of double counting. 
For example, we cannot add together the output loss costs and the Fiscal 
(Exchequer) costs. In a sense these fiscal costs are purely a notional, not a real, 
cost. In an ideal world we would aggregate all these costs and benefits 
by attaching weights to the costs and benefits obtained by different 
individuals or groups (classes). However, this would require making a 
series of value judgements which would very likely be questioned. 
In fact, what we shall do is simply provide some estimates for the 
output loss costs, the exchequer costs and the costs to the individual. 
For the costs to society we are unable to provide any quantitative 
estimates. 
To be able to properly evaluate the costs and benefits of unemployment 
we need to specify: 
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(i) What caused unemployment to rise; 
(ii) What lower level of unemployment we consider; and 
(iii) How this lower level of unemployment is to be achieved, i.e. 
what specific policies generate the lower unemployment level. 
We stated earlier in 3.1 that the implicit assumption in this work 
(by others and by this author) is that unemployment is avoidable, i.e. an 
alternative set of policies would lead to a lower unemployment rate. The 
view taken by this author is that the main reason for the growth in 
unemployment is due to a lack of effective demand. Some authors have argued 
that high real wage rates, high social security benefits, or increased 
power of trade unions etc. have caused the growth of unemployment. Clearly 
one's view of the causes of unemployment affects the evaluation of the 
costs of unemployment. For example, if higher unemployment was caused by 
increased social security benefits, the unemployment is voluntary and 
therefore has no costs. This is clearly an issue which cannot be discussed 
in this Report. 
In order to specify which lower rate of unemployment to consider we 
need to evaluate whether there is a 'feasible' or 'frictional' or 'natural' 
rate of unemployment. It may be possible to decompose actual unemployment 
into 'frictional', 'structural' and 'demand deficient' components. If so, 
we can consider bringing unemployment down to the frictional (or frictional 
plus structural) level by appropriate demand management policies. 
Alternatively, we can consider bringing the unemployment rate to the 
'natural' rate - we consider this in the next section. 
Although we should specify the 'policy scenario' that leads to the 
lower unemployment rate to evaluate the costs of unemployment, we shall 
assume this problem away. For example the costs of unemployment associated 
with increased public investment and an incomes policy would be very differ­
ent from increased job creation schemes (targeted job subsidies) or from 
the abolition of trade unions. This is in fact a very important issue 
but to be able to handle this issue properly we need well specified 
macroeconometric models (preferably multisectoral) with clearly defined 
policy variables. This may be worth exploring at some future date. 
3.3 On Natural Rates 
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(4) 
The 'natural rate' of unemployment is a misnomer: there is nothing 
natural about it. Although it is often treated as an 'equilibrium' rate, 
it is not even necessarily an equilibrium rate in the sense that there 
are forces in the system that are leading the unemployment rate to this 
'natural' level. Recent estimates of the 'natural' rates have them 
increasing pari passu with the actual rates of unemployment. To quote 
Solow (1985TÌ 
"'natural rate' has very little basis either in 
theory or in data analysis" (p. 4) 
Milton Friedman's (1968) definition of the natural rate is 
"the level that would be ground out by the Walrasian 
system of general equilibrium equations ..." 
Friedman's work led to numerous estimates of expectations augmented 
Phillips curves with the natural rate being defined as one where inflation-
ary expectations were realised. It is argued that if unemployment is less 
than the natural rate it will lead to accelerating inflation. However, 
as Solow (1985) very correctly points out, it should also imply that if 
unemployment exceeds the natural rate, there should be accelerating 
deflation: at present most estimates of natural rates are below the actual 
rates.' ($' 
Hargreaves Heap (1980) in an interesting article, discussed the 
concept of hysteresis: a high rate of unemployment today leads to a higher 
rate of unemployment in the future. 
With so much controversy over the theoretical concept of a natural 
rate as well as differing empirical estimates, we decided to ignore them. 
Instead we used arbitrary levels of unemployment which had been achieved 
in the past. 
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3. 4 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, we discussed the concept of costs (and benefits) 
of unemployment and outlined various aspects of these costs. We argued 
that to discuss the Welfare aspects of unemployment would be an extremely 
complicated exercise. Instead we would discuss a sub-set of the costs 
of unemployment without any attempt at aggregation. Finally, we 
discussed some of the limitations of the concept of the natural rate of 
unemployment. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 3 
1. See Kalecki (1943) and Junankar (1985). 
2. This view is put across forcefully in several papers in Lucas and 
Sargent (1981) 
3. See Feldstein (1978). 
4. See Johnson 4 Layard (1984), Hargreaves Heap (1980) and Solow (1985). 
5. For example Johnson & Layard (1984) estimate the natural (equilibrium) 
rates for France, Germany and U.K. as 8.1, 3.5 and 6.5 percent 
respectively. The actual unemployment rates were 8.0, 8.0 and 13.1 
respectively. 
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Chapter 4. The Real Costs of Unemployment: Output Loss 
"Focus on the gap helps to remind policymakers of the large 
reward associated with ... an improvement." Okun (1970) 
4. 1 Introduction 
The real economic cost to society of the high levels of unemployment 
lies in the loss of current and future potential output. If all (or per­
haps more accurately, many) of the unemployed found work today, they would 
be producing more goods and services and National Income would be higher 
today. Clearly an interesting question is how much higher would National 
Income have been if the unemployment levels in the EEC were at a lower 
level (say that before the oil price shock). If the answer to this 
question is that the order of magnitude is in excess of 10% of National 
Income, then society is paying a very high price for this unemployment. 
If the answer were less than 1%, perhaps we would be justified in saying 
that it is not worth making such a fuss about unemployment. In addition, 
an interesting (but difficult) question is to what extent future output 
is affected by current high levels of unemployment. A slack economy 
lowers the rate of real investment in new capital goods and new technology. 
In addition skills of unemployed workers deteriorate and Chey would be less 
productive in the future. However, quantitative estimates of this future 
loss are difficult to obtain. Implicit in our approach is that the 
unemployment levels of the past decade are not "natural" or "God-given" -
Society and Governments can lower the unemployment level by alternative 
social and economic policies. 
Having emphasised the importance of measuring the output loss costs 
of unemployment, we enter the problematic area of estimating this cost. 
Ideally, we would like to estimate the potential output (that level of 
output which would have been produced) if the unemployment level was at 
some lower level. Two problems appear immediately: firstly, which 
particular lower rate of unemployment do we assume and secondly, how do 
we estimate the increased output from the increased employment (decreased 
unemployment)? In Chapter we discussed the a-.alytical problems of 
defining the so-called natural rate of unemployment or the "Non-Accelerating 
Inflation Rate of Unemployment" (NAIRU). Even if there were agreement on 
an analytical definition, there are several different estimates (or for 
some countries none) of this rate and hence there is no obvious rate to 
choose. As mentioned earlier, the concept of a natural rate is very 
unhelpful, especially when the natural rate seems to increase, pari passu 
with the actual rate of unemployment.^· ' An alternative to using the 
natural rate concept is to use an ad hoc procedure: what would National 
Income have been if unemployment levels were that experienced in (say) 
1968-73 (prior to the first oil shock) or 1974-79 (prior to the recent 
international recession). In our discussion below we shall use these 
alternative definitions. 
There are several different methods of estimating the output level 
if an economy experienced a lower rate of unemployment (higher level of 
employment). The most commonly used methods are: 
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(a) the average product method which assumes that the unemployed, if 
given employment would produce the average product of the existing employed 
population; 
(b) the average wage method which assumes that the marginal contribution 
(marginal product) of a worker is equal to the wages paid and uses the average 
wages to calculate the extra output created by increasing employment; 
(c) The trend method which estimates trends for output growth over 
time and then measures the deviation of actual output levels from the trend 
levels; 
and (d) Okun's law method which attempts to evaluate the output loss 
resulting directly from unemployment and indirectly from lower average hours 
worked and lower participation rates. 
Each of these methods is subject to various qualifications. However, 
in each case the estimates of output loss we obtain are so large that, 
even allowing for any measurement problems, the magnitudes are far too 
serious to ignore. The EEC would be much better off if policies were 
instituted to lower the rate of unemployment. 
The remainder of this chapter discusses in more detail the different 
methods of estimating output loss and provides some estimates. A final 
section summarises the evidence. 
- 24 -
4.2 Measuring the Output Loss 
As mentioned earlier, there are short-run (static) and long-run (dynamic) 
costs of unemployment. The static costs of unemployment are the opportunity 
cost of unemployment: what is the alternative level of national income 
(Gross Domestic Product) if the unemployment level were lower? To answer 
this question completely correctly we need to know how this alternative 
level of unemployment would be achieved (i.e. what alternative policies or 
alternative values of exogenous variables would lead to this outcome) since 
this would provide us with information about which sectors' employment would 
increase (and with knowledge of the sectoral output response or elasticity) 
we could then evaluate and aggregate the increased national income^ . For 
example, if the current level of unemployment is 3 million and we want to 
know the loss of output due to this we can ask how much extra output would 
be produced if unemployment were reduced to (say) 1 million. The extra 
output produced would depend on whether the policies were stimulating labour 
intensive but low-valued products (say handcrafted toys) or capital intensive 
but high valued products (say radio-telescopes). Again, if the 
unemployment were to be reduced by assuming alternative values of exogenous 
variables, we would get different estimates of lost output depending on the 
different assumptions e.g. a faster rate of growth of GDP (or higher rates 
of inflation) in America would stimulate exports and hence decrease 
unemployment. This sectoral information is particularly relevant since 
the recent growth of employment has been mainly in the services sector while 
the decline has been mainly in the industrial sector. However, this would 
require multi-sectoral econometric models of the economy with an amount of 
information and data which were unavailable to us. To reiterate, to get 
precise estimates we need a well specified multi-sectoral model and a well 
specified alternative 'scenario': for each different scenario, we would get 
a different estimate. 
In fact, what we have done (in line with previous investigators) is 
to assume that by some unspecified method, unemployment is lower and the 
previously unemployed are employed in different industries in the same 
proportions as the existing stock of employment. In some cases we have 
assumed that the unemployed would find work in the industries from which they 
had lost their jobs. We know that bo ui these assumptions are approximations 
to reality and the longer the period over which we calculate these losses, 
the less precise the estimates become. This is because over the years the 
structure of the economy has changed enormously. 
The dynamic costs of unemployment may be far greater than the static 
costs. However, they are difficult to estimate. As mentioned earlier, the 
dynamic costs of unemployment are the future output losses due to current 
high levels of unemployment. A high level of unemployment, a low level of 
capacity utilisation, depressed expectations of aggregate demand and 
profitability lead to lower levels of investment in real capital goods and 
slow down the introduction of new technology (via the new capital goods)^J'. 
This lower investment implies lower levels of future output and hence much 
greater economic losses. However, opposed to this view is the one put across 
by the UK Government that the high unemployment is leading to a weeding out 
of inefficient firms and industries and increasing productivity of workers 
due to a "new realism in industrial relations". In a recent paper Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1983) have argued that high unemployment may increase the product-
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ivity of workers because of the threat of being fired and joining a long line 
of the unemployed. Muellbauer and Mendis (1983 ) have attempted to study 
the evidence for Britain and find that although there has been an increase 
in productivity, it is simply a "once-for-all" phenomenon. This is also the 
argument put forward in Buiter and Miller (1981 and 1983 ). Again, it is 
difficult to quantify these long-term costs although, in principle, they are 
quantifiable. 
Perhaps an equally important dynamic (long-term) cost of unemployment 
is the deterioration of human capital due to (especially) long duration of 
unemployment. People who have been unemployed for long periods would lose 
their skills and, in some cases due to technological change, their previous 
skills would be obsolete. Of course, there is a high proportion of the 
unemployed who are unskilled workers without any formal training. But 
even so-called unskilled workers learn on the job and are more efficient 
than a complete newcomer. The recent recession has seen a big increase in 
unemployment of older (presumably more skilled) workers and an increase in 
early retirement schemes. These schemes are equivalent to "early-scrapping" 
schemes for physical capital goods. In addition, because of the growing 
problem of youth unemployment, investment in human capital has declined 
(at least in work-experience related human capital). This means that 
future levels of production would be lower if and when the young of today 
find work. 
There are several reasons why any estimate of the output loss cost is 
subject to measurement error^'. Some of these factors might lead to an 
underestimate and some to an overestimate or with some small probability 
these two biases might just cancel out. The factors that might lead to an 
estimate of output loss being an under-estímate are: 
(a) Because the measured unemployment rate excludes certain categories 
of potential workers, e.g. married women, young people who have never had 
jobs, early retirement of workers and, in Italy, those covered by the 
Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (C.I.G). In this chapter we have relied on 
published statistics on unemployment so that, in general, we have made no 
allowance for these "hidden unemployed". Some of the methods of estimating 
output loss make no allowance for the fall in average hours worked, 
decreases in participation rate and lower rate of utilisation, which 
usually accompany the increase in unemployment. 
(b) A particular problem, especially for West Germany, is that the 
unemployment figures do not take account of returned migrants. 
(c) In general, the dynamic output loss costs are not quantified. 
The factors that might lead to an over-estimate of output loss are: 
(a) The measured unemployment rate includes the voluntarily unemployed 
(which for the New Classical school includes all the unemployed). In 
addition a large proportion, so it is argued, of the unemployment rate is 
a "natural rate" and hence should be deducted from the measured unemployment 
rate. 
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(b) It is argued that a proportion (for some economists a very high one) 
of the unemployed is engaged in the "informal sector" (or the "underground 
economy") so that, if unemployment is reduced via growth in the formal 
sector, the informal sector would decline. Hence the net increase in real 
GDP (as opposed to measured GDP) would be small. Work done on the informal 
sector by some sociologists, however, suggest that participants in the 
informal sector are more likely to have formal sector employment as well. 
Employment in the formal sector provides the workers with a network of 
contacts as customers as well as intermediate producers. In addition, 
employees in the formal sector have access to tools and equipment for use 
in the evenings or at weekends (e.g. a garage mechanic). 
(c) Unemployed people are usually less skilled and often work in 
industries (occupations) with low productivity. To ascribe to the unemployed 
average productivity in the economy would lead to an upward bias. Some of 
the methods listed below attempt to make some correction for this bias. 
(d) The high level of unemployment may lead to increased productivity 
of the employed labour force due to the threat of being fired (made redundant) 
Hence, if unemployment were decreased, productivity may decrease: an 
estimate based on unchanged productivity would then be biased upwards. 
Thus we see that there are some conceptual problems as well as several 
measurement problems involved in estimating the output loss costs of 
unemployment. In other words, the numerical estimates we provide give a 
rough indication of the magnitudes of the costs. We shall provide a range 
of alternative estimates (as well as some average estimates) which we believe 
give an indication of the seriousness of the problem^) . 
For purposes of comparability we have used annual OECD time series data 
on employment, unemployment and GDP. Diagrams 4.1 to 4.8 illustrate output 
(GDP) and Unemployment in France, West Germany, Italy and U.K. In general, 
we have used the published series on unemployment although we shall comment 
on the limitations in our discussion below. Appendix discusses the 
sources and definitions of the data. 
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4.3 The Average Product Method 
In this section we outline the method employed, provide some estimates, 
and discuss its limitations. The method we used was to obtain the average 
product of the employed worker and as s ume that each of the unemployed would 
potentially be capable of producing the same amount. In the first instance 
we simply divided the Gross Domestic Product by the numbers employed to give 
an estimate of average product. In general, the average product in a 
recession is an underestimate of the average product in a full employment 
situation. This means we are likely to under-estímate the true costs of 
unemployment for this reason alone. As mentioned earlier we assumed that 
by some unspecified means unemployment is reduced from the actual level to 
a hypothetical level which may be a level of "frictional", "natural" or 
"feasible" (in the short run) unemployment. The two arbitrary levels of 
unemployment we assumed (in this section and for the rest of this Chapter) 
were the average of the 1968-73 level and the average of the 1974-79 level 
(a 'low' and 'high' level of unemployment which gives a 'high' and 'low' 
estimate of costs respectively)(°). 
Table 4.1 
Output Loss Estimates: Average Product Method (Percentage of GDP) 
Federal Republic 
of Germany France Italy U.K 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Low 
0.46 
1.93 
4 .01 
5.92 
High 
2.52 
4.00 
6.04 
7.76 
Low 
2.49 
3.63 
4.24 
4.28 
High 
4.27 
5.42 
5.95 
6 .01 
Low 
1.42 
2.43 
3.17 
4.03 
High 
2 .40 
3.40 
4.15 
5.00 
Low 
2.08 
5.83 
7.49 
8.45 
High 
3.59 
7.40 
9.09 
10.04 
Notes: 1. The estimates are derived as follows: 
GDP Output Loss * ■=—. vma x (Unemployment in period t - Average Unemployment) 
2. All estimates are percentages of GDP: (0utP"t Loss χ 1 0 0 ) 
GDP 
3. The 'Low' estimates used the average of 1974-79 unemployment levels 
and the 'high' estimates used the 1968-73 average unemployment 
level. 
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These are very crude estimates of output loss and do not allow for 
changes in average hours worked, participation rates etc. However, leaving 
aside the measurement problems we observe dramatic increases in the costs 
of unemployment (as measured by this average product method) for each of the 
four countries. If we use the 'low' estimates the costs of unemployment 
have increased from 1980 to 1983 by 71% for France, 1,187% for the FRG, 
184% for Italy and 306% for the U.K. The respective increase using the 
'high' estimates are 41%, 208%, 108% and 180%. 
These output loss figures estimates are substantial but, we believe, 
serious underestimates because we have used only published unemployment 
statistics. For example, in France, the numbers who have taken early 
retirement lead to an underestimate of unemployment, see for instance 
Lagrave (1983 ). For the FRG, the published unemployment figures exclude 
the so-called "hidden unemployed" (as well as the returned migrants). For 
Italy the unemployment figures exclude the industrial workers covered under 
the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) scheme. In Britain, the unemployment 
figures until 1982 were for registered unemployment (and excluded many 
married women) and, since 1982, only include those in receipt of benefits. 
In addition, under recent legislation in Britain, unemployed men over 
59 years of age are treated as retired workers. To avoid any charges of 
bias, we have decided to use only published statistics. The IAB, Nürnberg, 
publishes a series of 'hidden unemployment' which is not disputed 
by the FRG Ministry of Employment. Using this series, the estimates 
for the Federal Republic of Germany become: 
Table 4.2 
Output Loss Estimates for the Federal Republic of Germany: Average 
Product Method 
Real Unemployment (Registered & Hidden) 
Low High 
1980 0.25 4.85 
1981 2.20 6.91 
1982 5.22 9.96 
1983 7.91 12.66 
Notes: 1. All figures are percentages of GDP. See note to table 4.1 
2. The data for hidden unemployment were obtained from MittAB 
4/1984 published by IAB, Nürnberg. Not surprisingly, 
inclusion of the hidden unemployment figures increase the 
estimates of output loss quite substantially. 
As mentioned earlier, estimates of output loss depend on which policy 
scenario is assumed to reduce the unemployment level. In particular, 
policies that stimulate high valued output sectors would lead to a larger 
increase in GDP. In the absence of any information, the average product 
method (as opposed to taking average productivity in the sectors from 
which the unemployed originate) may be a reasonable 'best' estimate. 
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4.4 The Average Wage Method 
In this approach it is assumed that the wages paid reflect (to some 
extent) the marginal product of employment. It is then further assumed that 
the unemployed, if found employment, would receive the same wage and have 
the same marginal product. In the absence of knowledge of how and where the 
extra jobs would be created, it seems an average wage for the whole economy 
may be an appropriate assumption. In fact there is much evidence to suggest 
that the unemployed are, in general, less skilled and earn less than average. 
Some investigators have assumed (fairly arbitrarily) that the unemployed, 
if found employment, would receive 80% of the average wage. Since we 
believe the measured unemployment figures are substantially under­estimates, 
we have used the average wages (earnings), rather than a fraction of them, 
to provide our output loss estimates. Table 4.2 again provides 'low' and 
'high' estimates based on assuming that unemployment is brought down to the 
1974­79 average of the 1968­73 average, respectively. For purposes of 
comparability we have used data for the average annual earnings in manufac­
turing (all industries). Since many of the unemployed originated from 
this sector, it may be a plausible assumption. 
Table 4.3 
Output Loss estimates: Average Wage Method (Percentage of GDP) 
Italy 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
Low High 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
0.29 
1.25 
2 .81 
4 .01 
1.55 
2.59 
4 .23 
5.46 
France U.K 
Low High Low High Low High 
1.52 
2 .71 
3.36 
3.65 
2 .61 
4.05 
4 .71 
5.12 
1.86 
3.76 
5.76 
8.33 
3.15 
5 .31 
7.54 
10.34 
2.14 
6 .51 
8.74 
9.92 
3.69 
8.27 
10.60 
11.81 
Notes: 1. Output Loss ■ Average Annual Earnings χ (Unemployment in period t 
Average Unemployment) 
2. All estimates are percentages of GDP: p χ 100. 
GUP 
3. See note 3, Table 4.1. 
As in the average product method, these estimates are fairly high 
and increase very rapidly over the period. The estimates for France and 
the Federal Republic of Germany are lower and for Italy and the U.K. higher 
than the average product method. These differences may be due to our using 
the average manufacturing earnings. 
In table 4.3 we provide estimates for the Federal Republic of 
Germany using the published series on hidden unemployment. 
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Table 4.4 
Output Loss Estimates for Federal Republic of Germany: Average Wage Method 
Real Unemployment (Registered & Hidden) 
Low High 
1980 0.15 3.00 
1981 1.42 4.44 
1982 3.52 6.74 
1983 5.36 8.64 
Notes: See notes to Tables 4.2 and 4.3 
We have already discussed various reasons for under- or over-estimation 
involved in these estimates. However, even if we take the low estimates, 
the costs of unemployment are serious and have grown very rapidly. 
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4.5 The Trend Method 
This method is based on assuming that tue growth of production (GDP) 
continues at the same rate as in the nineteen sixties and seventies. In 
other words, assuming that capital stock growth (investment), employment 
growth, and technological change continued at the same rate, GDP in the 
nineteen eighties would have been at higher levels but for the recession 
and growth of unemployment. Thus we try to estimate "potential" GDP and 
then compare the actual level of GDP with it: the gap between potential GDP 
and actual GDP then measures the output loss costs of unemployment (and 
in fact, of under utilisation of capital, slowing down of investment and 
technological change). This method further assumes that this "gap" is 
due to unemployment and that any slow down in investment and technological 
change, changes in utilisation rates are due to the unemployment. In 
effect this method side-steps the problem of asking to which particular lower 
level of unemployment the economy is to be brought down or what are the 
'frictional' or 'natural' rates of unemployment. In effect, it assumes 
that the current levels of unemployment should be brought down to the past 
levels. Before we discuss this method, it is worth stressing that this is 
a wider definition of the costs of unemployment since it allows for 
changing utilisation rates of capital and labour (average hours worked). 
Although there are several different methods of estimating 'potential' 
output (see Briscoe, Smyth and O'Brien ( )), we followed a method 
of estimating trend levels of output by Ordinary Least Squares. 
We assumed that GDP increased at an exponential rate although we allowed 
for a structural break immediately after the oil price shock. The equations 
we estimated were: 
An Y = β + β. Time + β„ Dummy o l 2 
i.e. we fitted an exponential trend and allowed for a shift in the intercept 
by introducing a Dummy to capture the effects of the oil price shock. The 
equations were fitted on annual time series data from the 1950s up to 
1979/80 (see Table 4.5) and then used to predict the (potential) GDP values 
from 1980 to 1983. The Output loss figures are then calculated by taking 
the difference between the predicted (potential) GDP and the actual GDP and 
are presented in Table 4.5 as percentages of potential GDP. 
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Country 
FRG 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
Sample 
1950­80 
1950­80 
1950­80 
1950­80 
Table 
Estimation of 
Constant 
12.605 
(507.41) 
12.99 
(1554.92) 
10.474 
(1128.25) 
10.865 
(1540.46) 
4.5 
Trend GDP 
Dummy 
­0.205 
(­5.30) 
­0.068 
(­5.21) 
­0.152 
(­10.47) 
­0.046 
(­4.29) 
Time 
0.054 
(32.59) 
0.051 
(90.62) 
0.053 
(85.48) 
0.029 
(58.27) 
R^ 
0.980 
0.998 
0.997 
0.995 
DW 
0.40 
0.45 
0.88 
1.13 
Notes: 1. The equation fitted was of the form 
In y = β + β Dummy + ß­Time 
2. Dummy = 0 until 1974 
= 1 1975 and later 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Table 
Output Loss Estimates: 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
6.86 
11.86 
17.39 
21.00 
4.6 
Trend Method 
France 
6.82 
11.15 
14.21 
17.66 
(Percentage 
Italy 
4.63 
9.47 
14.47 
17.94 
of GDP) 
\ U.K. 
6.78 
10.57 
11.08 
10.75 
As in earlier estimates, the output loss costs of unemployment increase 
substantially over the period and for (say) 1983 are well over 10% of GDP, 
which is a very substantial cost. 
As mentioned earlier this is a wider definition of the costs of 
unemployment and allows (to some extent) for changes in utilisation rates 
etc. The main problem with this method is the assumption that we can 
extrapolate the trend growth rates. 
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4.6 Okun's Law Method 
In our estimates of output loss based on the average product or average 
wage method, we mentioned that they were likely to be underestimates because 
we assumed that when unemployment was reduced by (say) 1,000, employment 
would increase by 1,000 with unchanged average hours and average productivity. 
In fact when we decrease unemployment by some policy measures, average hours 
worked increase, capacity utilisation increases, participation rates increase 
(so that employment increases by more than 1,000) and average productivity 
increases. Okun's law asserts that a reduction in unemployment, measured 
as a percentage of the labor force, has a much larger than proportionate 
effect on output". (Okun (19 70) p. 140). Early estimates by Okun and 
others found (for the USA) that a fall in Unemployment of 1 percentage 
point led to a 3 per cent rise in GDP. Recent estimates by Gordon (1984) 
find that the increase in GDP would be closer to 2 per cent for a fail in 
unemployment by 1 percentage point. 
Following Okun (1970) we estimated a relationship between the 
percentage unemployment rate and the percentage output "gap". This output 
gap is defined as the deviation of actual output (GDP) from "potential" 
output (GDP) expressed as a percentage of potential output (GDP). The 
procedure requires an estimate of "potential" output for which we followed 
an iterative procedure (see Appendix to this chapter). In effect we 
estimated an exponential trend for GDP allowing for a break as a result of 
the oil price shock. Given the estimated trend growth rate, we iterated 
in the neighbourhood of this value and chose that equation which gave the 
best fit (R2) and Durbin Watson statistics in an. acceptable range. 
The trends were estimated on annual data from 1950 to 1980 (in some cases 
from 1962 to 1980) and then unemployment was regressed on the gap over the 
whole sample 1950 to 1983. Implicitly we assume that the growth rate in the 
period up to 1980 continued into the 1980s. 
The estimated equations were: 
Percent Unemployment Rate » Constant + b Gap 
Having obtained a best fit and acceptable Durbin-Watson statistics, we 
used the estimated coefficient 6 to obtain estimates of output loss if 
unemployment rates were brought down to the averages of 1968-73 and 1974-79 
respectively. Thus.if the estimated coefficient b is equal to 0.5, it 
means that a reduction in unemployment of 1 percentage point would increase 
GDP and hence reduce the gap by 2 percent, i.e. each percent of unemployment 
has an output loss cost of 2 per cent. 
The results for our sample of European countries are presented in 
Tables 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. 
Country 
FRG 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
Sample 
L962­80 
II 
II 
1950­80 
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Table 4.7 
Estimation of 
Constant 
13.35 
(1242.0) 
13.52 
(1641.0) 
11.15 
(1104.0) 
10.86 
Dummy 
­0.087 
(­5.57) 
­0.08 
(­6.70) 
­0.07 
(­3.66) 
­0.02 
Potential 
Time χ 
Dummy 
"~ 
­
­0.014 
(­2.58) 
­0.0079 
GDP 
Time 
0.0414 
(30.79) 
0.0515 
(49.9) 
0.049 
(38.50) 
0.029 
~¿ 
0.991 
0.997 
0.994 
0.996 
DW 
1.68 
0.96 
1.07 
1.25 
(1621.0) (­1.23) (­2.07) (61.48) 
Notes: 1. The equation fitted was of the form 
in Y = β + β Dummy + β (Time χ Dummy) + ß.Time 
2. Dummy = 0 until 1974 
= 1 1975 and later 
Country 
FRG 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
Table 
Final Estimates of Okun's 
Sample 
1962-1983 
1968-1983 
1962-1983 
1962-1983 
Constant 
66.65 
(2.39) 
27.19 
(8.5) 
4.94 
(27.36) 
1.13 
(4.47) 
4.8 
Law (Iterative 
Gap 
0.366 
(9.47) 
0.29 
(8.19) 
0.248 
(10.31) 
0.505 
(16.47) 
Method) 
R2 
0.809 
0.815 
0.842 
0.931 
DW 
0.76 
0.49 
0.88 
1.53 
Notes: 1. In spite of the iterative solution the Durbin Watson statistics 
are very poor and suggest the existence of serial correlation 
except for the U.K. 
2. The regressions were run on samples from the 1960s because 
data on percentage unemployment rates were not available for 
earlier periods. 
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Table 4.9 
Output Loss Estimates: Okun's Law Method (Percentage of GDP) 
FRG France Italy U.K. 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Low 
-
3.00 
8.74 
13.38 
High 
6.69 
10.25 
15.98 
20.63 
Low 
6.14 
9.59 
12.00 
14.06 
High 
13.27 
16.72 
19.14 
21.20 
Low 
3.43 
7.06 
9.48 
13.51 
High 
6.77 
10.40 
12.82 
16.85 
Low 
3.01 
9.54 
12.32 
13.70 
High 
6.53 
13.07 
15.84 
17.23 
As mentioned earlier, Okun's Law method provides a better estimate of 
the output loss since it takes account of changes in average hours, participation 
rates, utilisation rates etc. As Table 4.7 illustrates, even if we use the "low" 
estimates (i.e. using average 1974-79 unemployment rates) the output loss in 
1983 is well over ten percent for each country. The "high" estimates give out­
put loss figures of over twenty percent for France and the Federal German 
Republic and about seventeen percent for Italy and the U.K. These are truly 
staggering amounts and justify the quotation from Okun at the top of this 
chapter. 
There are, of course, several reasons why we should be cautious of these 
estimates. Firstly, in fitting time trends to the GDP data, we eliminated some 
of the earlier data to obtain a better fit. Secondly, even though we followed 
an iterative procedure to obtain estimates of Okun's Law equations, the 
equations are still subject to serial correlation. Thirdly, although we have 
allowed for a break after the oil price shock, we have assumed that the trend 
growth rate remains unchanged thereafter. However, it is satisfying to see 
that our estimated Okun's Law coefficient for this set of countries is similar 
to the original one estimated by Okun. 
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4.7 Summary Results 
This section summaries the various estimates and provides average 
estimates. 
Average 
Product 
Low 
1980 0.46 
1981 1.93 
1982 4 .01 
1983 5.92 
High 
2.52 
4.00 
6.04 
7.76 
Table 4.10 
.(7) Federal Republic of Germany 
Average Wage Trend Okun 
Low 
0.29 
1.25 
2.81 
4.01 
High 
1.55 
2.59 
4.23 
5.46 
6.86 
11.86 
17.39 
21.00 
Low 
3.00 
8.74 
13.38 
High 
6.69 
10.25 
15.98 
20.63 
Average 
Low 
1.90 
4:51 
8.24 
11.00 
High 
4.41 
7.18 
10.91 
13.71 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Average 
Product 
Low 
2.49 
3.63 
4.24 
4.28 
High 
4.27 
5.42 
5.95 
6.01 
Table 4 .11 
France 
Average Wage 
Low 
1.52 
2.71 
3.36 
3.65 
High 
2.61 
4.05 
4.71 
5.12 
Trend 
6.82 
11.15 
14.21 
17.66 
Okun 
Low 
6.14 
9.59 
12.00 
14.06 
High 
13.27 
16.72 
19.14 
21.20 
Average 
Low 
4.24 
6.77 
8.45 
9.91 
High 
6.74 
9.34 
11.00 
12.50 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Average 
Product 
Low 
1.42 
2.43 
3.17 
4.03 
High 
2.40 
3.40 
4.15 
5.00 
Table 4.12 
Italy 
Average Wage 
Low 
1.56 
3.76 
5.76 
8.33 
High 
3.15 
5.31 
7.54 
10.34 
Trend 
4.63 
9.47 
14.47 
17.94 
Okun 
Low 
3.43 
7.06 
9.48 
13.51 
High 
6.77 
10.40 
12.82 
16.85 
Ave 
Low 
2.84 
5.68 
8.22 
10.95 
rage 
High 
4.24 
7.15 
9.75 
12.53 
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Table 4.13 
United Kingdom 
Average Average Wage Trend Okun Average 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
Low 
2.08 
5.83 
7.49 
8.45 
Product 
High 
3.59 
7.40 
9.09 
10.04 
Low 
2.14 
6.51 
8.74 
9.92 
High 
3.69 
8.27 
10.60 
11.81 
6.78 
10.57 
11.08 
10.75 
Low 
3.01 
9.54 
12.32 
13.70 
High 
6.53 
13.07 
15.84 
17.23 
Low 
3.50 
8.11 
9.91 
10.71 
High 
5.15 
9.83 
11.65 
12.46 
Tables 4.10 to 4.13 illustrate the range of estimates we have obtained 
with the different methods. (The Trend estimate is included in both the 
averages in Tables 4.10 - 4.13). We had mentioned various reasons why we 
believe the average product and average wage method to be underestimates. 
In the final column we have provided averages of the various estimates as 
a 'compromise' estimate. On the basis of these compromise estimates, 
we can see that in almost each country the output loss costs of unemployment 
are about ten percent of GDP: this is a colossal loss of output for the 
EEC. 
- 42 -
4. 8 Some Qualifications 
In this Chapter we provided estimates of the output loss costs of 
unemployment. It has been argued that these are over-estimates of the welfare 
costs to society since they ignore possible benefits of lower rates of inflation 
as well as the benefits of "leisure" for the unemployed. It is still debatable 
whether inflation is held down by high rates of unemployment (estimates of 
Phillips curves have been very unstable) and some economists (Monetarists and 
New Classicals) argue that there is no theoretical basis for a trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment. Even if there were a trade off, it is very difficuli 
to quantify the benefits of a lower rate of inflation. It is also argued that 
since the unemployed are enjoying leisure (see Feldstein (1978 )), these 
benefits would be lost if they were found employment: hence we should subtract 
them from the output loss estimates. It is possible to use the value of 
social security benefits as an index of the value to the unemployed of leisure. 
However, in our opinion, most of the unemployed are involuntarily unemployed 
and to find employment is not a disutility. A job provides them with a place 
in society, respect from their peer group and family and, in general, provides 
them with the raison d'etre. A complete welfare analysis would have to take 
account of the psychic loss as well as the loss due to ill health of the 
unemployed. In addition, the loss to society in terms of higher rates of 
social disturbance (civil strife) and crime would have to be taken account of. 
All these are difficult, if not impossible to quantify. 
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4.9 Conclusions 
In this Chapter we discussed alternative methods of estimating output 
loss. We provided a whole range of alternative estimates and finally some 
"compromise" (average) estimates. We find that even on a conservative 
basis, the output loss figures are of the order of ten percent of GDP. 
This is an enormous loss of current output which could be used to tackle many 
of the pressing needs of society, e.g. better health, education, reducing 
poverty and inequality. We discussed the potential future loss of output 
but argued that these were difficult to quantify. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 4 
1. See Solow (1985) and Hargreaves- Heap (1980). 
2. See Feldstein (1978) 
3. See, for example, an earlier paper by me, Junankar (1970) where I 
showed that there was some evidence to suggest that investment in 
Britain was lowered by low levels of capacity utilisation. 
4. Some of these issues are discussed in OECD (1982). 
5. We were surprised how little work had been done on estimating the output 
loss for the EEC. The European Trade Union Institute (1984) is one of 
the few places where we could find comparative tables of output loss. 
Also see OECD (1982, 1984), House of Lords (1982) and Sinfield and 
Fraser (1985). 
6. Our 'high' estimates are very similar to those in Table 5 of the 
European Trade Union Institute (1984) for the year 1982. We have provided, 
in contrast, estimates for 1980-83 inclusive. 
7. For Germany, Reyher, Koller and Spitznagel (1980) provide an estimate of 
output loss of 5.5% of GNP in 1978 (p. 61). Reyher and Spitznagel (in OECD 
1984) provide an estimate of output loss of about 7% of GNP in 1982 (p. 152) 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Estimation of Okun's Law Equations 
4.A.1 Okun's Law 
This is a relationship between the percentage unemployment rate and 
the percentage gap between potential and actual GDP. This requires estimates 
of potential GDP. 
4.A.2 Method 
We estimated the following regression 
in Y = β + β Dummy + β (Time χ Dummy) + β­ Time 
(where Y is GDP) by Ordinary Least Squares on annual data from 19 to 1980. 
The Dummy was to take account of the oil price shock. 
With the estimates of β(»β β, β0 β,) we constructed a time series for 
o 1 ¿ o 
potential GDP and hence obtained a series for 
Gap = (i=I) 
Y 
We then generated alternative Gap series for different values of the 
growth rate of GDP, allowing for two standard errors on either side of the 
estimated growth rate (at intervals of 0.25 of the standard error). 
Each of these Gap series was used to estimate by Ordinary Least 
Squares 
UR = a + a. Gap (i) o 1 
i is 
of Gap. 
t*Vì 
where UR the percentage rate of unemployment and Gap (i) is the i series 
­2 We selected that equation which gave us the highest R and best D.W 
statistic. 
We then went through a second stage of iteration. Taking the estimated 
growth rate from the first iteration we searched at intervals of 0.05 near 
that value (up to two standard errors) and then selected the equation with 
the highest R 2 . In general R2 and D.W improved together. 
In summary, we estimated the Unemployment­Gap equation for alternative 
potential output series and chose the best fitting equation. This best 
equation was then used to generate estimates of output loss. 
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Chapter 5 Fiscal (Exchequer) Costs 
5.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter we discussed the real costs of unemployment in 
terms of lost output. In this Chapter we discuss the fiscal costs to the 
Government of increasing unemployment. The fiscal costs to the Government 
include the social security payments made to the unemployed plus any direct 
or indirect (cash or kind) help to unemployed people from the Government. 
In addition, they include the loss of tax revenue (from direct and indirect 
taxes) because people are unemployed and not earning an income and spending 
less on goods and services. 
It is important to note that these are all "transfer payments" and, 
hence, do not directly involve any real economic cost. The only real 
direct cost would be if the social security/taxation system used up real 
economic resources. Of course, these may be indirect real costs in terms 
of affecting incentives to work, save and invest. However, the importance 
of evaluating these fiscal costs lies in the fact that we can consider 
some economic policies to stimulate employment which may have a low (or 
negative?) cost to the Government because of the saving on social security 
payments (as well as the gain in increased taxes collected). In this 
Chapter we discuss the methodology employed and then discuss some estimates 
for France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. 
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5.2 Methodology 
The fiscal costs to the Government of the growth of unemployment provide 
an interesting insight into the Government's budget problems. During this 
recession, European Governments have met the crisis by tightening monetary 
and fiscal policy and attempting to curtail Government expenditure. 
However, as unemployment continues to rise, Government expenditure on social 
security payments rises rapidly. Some Governments are now attempting to 
tighten the conditions under which social security is made available to 
the unemployed, as well as reducing the rates of benefits paid out (for ex­
ample in the U.K. the Earnings Related Supplement payable to the unemployed 
for up to six months was abolished in 1982). It is therefore important 
to study the costs to the Government public finance of the growth of 
unemployment. 
The fiscal costs to the Government include 
(a) unemployment and other social security benefits; 
(b) loss of employer and employee contributions to national 
insurance schemes; 
(c) loss of direct and indirect taxes; and 
(d) administrative costs directly associated with unemployment. 
If, for example, unemployment rose by 100,000 the Government would pay 
out unemployment benefits to the unemployed. In addition they may pay 
supplements for rent, free meals and milk to schoolchildren of the 
unemployed, rebates on (property) rates etc. The unemployed would now have 
lost their incomes so they would pay less in income taxes (in the U.K. 
unemployment benefits are now treated as taxable income) and, because of 
their lower spending power, buy fewer goods and services and hence pay less 
indirect taxes (e.g. value added tax). The employers no longer pay 
national insurance contributions for these unemployed people and the 
unemployed do not pay employee contributions. Most studies exclude any 
additonal expenditures which may result from increased ill health 
(morbidity), social unrest etc. In evaluating these financial costs, 
it is usually assumed that the unemployed came from the private sector: 
if they were from the public sector the Government would, of course, save 
on their wages and salaries. Another important assumption made is that 
the Government does not react to the growth in fiscal costs by legislative 
changes to decrease unemployment benefits. 
Most studies (including this one) ignore the macroeconomic implications. 
They ignore the Keynesian multiplier effects, i.e. second-round effects of 
lower consumer expenditure. They also ignore any effects of the income 
redistribution (towards those with a marginal propensity to consume) on 
aggregate savings, hence investment, employment and output. Similarly, 
these studies ignore-ihe possible impact of the financing of the unemploy­
ment benefits (and the budget deficit) on interest rates and hence 
investment. Also ignored are any incentive (disincentive) effects on 
labour supply of benefits and taxes. All these may be estimated in a well 
specified macroeconometric model. However, to date this has not been done. 
To calculate these fiscal costs to the Government, several assumptions 
have to be made: 
(a) The earnings that the unemployed individuals would have received 
had they been employed. Typically it is assumed that the 
unemployed would have received the average earnings (or some 
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arbitrary fraction of it); 
(b) The direct tax rates applicable to the unemployed: this is 
usually difficult because taxes charged often vary with 
personal circumstances (e.g. number of children, income of 
spouse etc.); 
(c) Indirect taxes depend on assumptions about average propensities 
to consume, as well as on the particular commodities 
consumed; and 
(d) Amount of benefits received by the individuals, especially 
"passport" benefits like free school meals etc. 
Most of the studies discussed below calculate the costs of unemployment 
for all the unemployed. In fact, at present rates of unemployment, it is 
unrealistic to assume that all the unemployed could be found work within a 
year. In general, as unemployment falls, participation rates rise so that 
employment increases by more than the fall in unemployment. Some of the 
studies make some arbitrary adjustment for this problem. As discussed 
above we can see that there are several assumptions that need to be made to 
obtain estimates of these costs. Not surprisingly, the estimates obtained 
can be questioned on the basis of one assumption or another. However, 
the estimates provide a rough order of magnitude involved. 
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5.3 Fiscal Costs: Federal Republic of Germany 
The Institute for Employment Research (IAB, Nürnberg) has made detailed 
studies of the costs of unemployment for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
These studies by Reyher, Koller and Spitznagel (1980) and by Reyher and 
Spitznagel (OECD 1984) and Spitznagel (MittAB 1/85) provide a comprehensive 
account of the financial (fiscal) costs of unemployment. A further study 
by Bruche and Reissert (1985) provides a convenient source which provides 
a brief time-series of these costs. In Germany there are two kinds of 
unemployment benefits: Arbeitslosengeld (Alg) and Arbeitslosenhilfe (Alhi). 
The former (Alg) is similar to unemployment benefits in the U.K. and is at 
a higher level (68% of net income) than the latter (Alhi) (58% of net 
income) which is similar to Supplementary benefits in the U.K. Alg is paid 
for a fixed duration depending on length of employment (a maximum of 312 days 
after employment for 2 years) after which Alhi is paid for an unlimited 
period. 
Table 5.1 illustrates the Changing Fiscal Costs of Unemployment. 
(Unfortunately, we were unable to find data for estimates for 19 79, 1980 
and 1981). It is clear from these estimates that there was a big increase 
between 1978 and 1982 due to the recession (increase in unemployment from 
1 to 2.3 million) and then a smaller increase between 1982 and 1983. 
Between 1983 and 1984 there is a small fall due to reduced payments to 
the unemployed without children and there is a smaller number entitled to 
benefits and more are moving on to Alhi from Alg as long term unemployment 
increases. These estimates of fiscal costs are for registered unemployment: 
Reyher and Spitznagel (in OECD 1984) estimate that if "hidden" unemployment 
is included, the costs in 1982 would increase from 45 billion DM to 
54 billion DM. 
It is interesting to note that the direct expenditures on unemployment 
benefits are about 30% and the tax loss (both direct and indirect) is 
about 25% of the total fiscal costs. The public assistance on housing, 
welfare, etc. (a category for which estimates are not precise) is of the 
order of only 2%. The remainder of the costs are via health and pension 
schemes (national insurance). Overall, the fiscal costs have escalated 
due to the rapid growth of unemployment. In fiscal terms it is expensive 
to allow unemployment to continue: some job creation schemes involve very 
low net costs and are discussed in Reyher, Koller and Spitznagel (1980). 
- 50 -
Table 5.1 
Changes in the Fiscal Costs of Unemployment 1978-84 
1. Additional Expenditures 
Unemployment compensa­
tion (UC)(Arbeits­
losengeld) 
Unemployment assistance 
(UA)(Arbeitslosenhilfe) 
Contributions to 
pensions system for 
UC-recipients 
Contributions to 
health insurance for 
UC-recipients 
1.5 
Contributions to pension 0.3 
system for UA-recipients 
0.4 
3.5 
19.9 
DM bi 
1978 
9.2 
4.7 
1.2 
0.9 
liions (Current 
prices) 
1982 
25.6 
11.3 
3.3 
4.4 
1983 
27.5 
14.1 . 
3.9 J 
2.6 
1984 * 
23.8 
15.4 
1978 
46.0 
23.9 
6.2 
4.5 
1982 
56.9 
25.1 
7.2 
9.8 
% 
1983 
50.1 
25.6 . 
Ì 
7.1 J 
4.7 
1984* 
44.0 
28.5 
7.1 13.1 
Contributions to health 
insurance for UA-reci­
pients 
Public assistance, 
housing allowances 
Lost Revenues 
Direct taxes 
Indirect taxes 
Contributions to FEI 
Contributions to health 
insurance 
Contributions to 
pension system 
TOTAL 
Percentage of GDP 
Average costs for each 
unemployed person 
approx DM 
SOURCE: Bruche & Reissert (1985) 
3.0 
1.6 
1.1 
0.9 
3.8 
0.7 
1.1 
1.4 
7.4 
1.5 
2.1 
1.3 
6.7 
3.6 
2.3 
2.0 
6.9 
1.3 
2.0 
2.6 2.4 
10.8 
4.1 
1.4 
0.8 
1.0 
19.4 
8.3 
3.5 
2.1 
2.1 
27.4 
9.9 
3.4 
2.9 
2.8 
30.3 
10.2 
4.0 
3.0 
3.8 
53.9 
20.8 
6.8 
3.9 
4.8 
43.1 
18.4 
7.8 
4.7 
4.7 
49.9 
18.0 
6.2 
5.3 
5.1 
56.0 
18.9 
7.4 
5.5 
7.0 
3.4 8.4 9.3 17.8 7.6 15.3 17.2 
54.1 45.0 54.9 
2.8 3.3 
20.000 24.000 24.000 23.100 
100 100 100 100 
** 
From Spitznagel, MittAB: 1/85 
Source: Eurostat Social Protection Statistical Bulletin 1/85 
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5.4 Fiscal Costs: France 
As in Germany, the growth of unemployment has led to an escalation 
of fiscal costs for the French Government. As discussed earlier (see 
Chapter 2) a feature of the French policy has been a massive increase 
in policies for early retirement. This has implied a big increase 
in expenditures and hence on the fiscal costs of unemployment. In. a 
recent paper Lagrave (1983) has estimated the fiscal costs of unemployment 
(see Table 5.2). 
Table 5.2 
Changes in the Fiscal Costs of Unemployment: France 
(billion FF) 
1982 1983 Types of Cost 
Direct financial cost (UNEDIC): 
Unemployment benefits 
Income guarantee 
Other expenditure (admin, etc.) 
II. Losses in receipts: 
1. Social security 
- remove 1 percentage point 
from sickness contribution 
for unemployment benefit 
above minimum wage (SMIC) 
2. Taxation 
Direct taxes 
Indirect taxes 
Total 
III. Related costs: 
(Employment policy) 
Overall total 
In percentage of G.D.P, 
1980 1981 
33.2 
1.3 
34.5 
35.0 
15.0 
4.7 
54.7 
44 .3 
24.7 
4.7 
76.2 
51 .0 
38 .1 
9 .3 
98.4 
31.2 
4.5 
46.9 
0.6 
5.8 
64.7 
0.8 
6.5 
83.4 
0.9 
31.2 
8.0 
5 .3 
44.5 
31.0 
110.0 
46 .3 
12.0 
10.8 
69 .1 
34.7 
158.5 
63.9 
16.5 
11.2 
91.6 
40.5 
208.3 
82.5 
21.2 
16.4 
120.0 
(40.5) 
(258.9) 
Source : Michel Lagrave: Les difficultés de'évaluation du coût du 
chômage, in Revue Française des Affaires Sociales, January-
March 1983. 
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The expenditures on unemployment benefits increased rapidly from 35 
billion to 51 billion French Francs from 1981 to 1983. Total direct costs 
increase from 34.5 billions to 98.4 billions of French Francs over the same 
period. In 1982, taking account of direct and indirect costs, the total 
is 6.5Z of GDP. As mentioned earlier, these costs exclude additional costs 
for increased sickness, social disorders, crimes etc. which may be 
associated with higher levels of unemployment. 
The OECD estimates the costs of employment policy: 
Table 5.3 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
Costs of Employment Policy 
Unemployment compensation 
Incentives to withdraw from 
labour markets-
Employment support^ 
Promotion of employment and job 
creation-* 
Work encouragement measures 
Vocational training-* 
Improvement of labour market 
operation0 
Total 
(as percentage of GDP) 
1973 
1.89 
1.58 
0.14 
0.50 
0.08 
5.72 
0.26 
10.17 
0.9 
: France 
FF bi 
1980 
26.41 
10.97 
2.36 
2.67 
1.38 
19.82 
1.07 
64.68 
2.3 
Ilion 
1981 
39.16 
17.88 
2.99 
4.26 
1.68 
22.76 
1.33 
90.06 
2.9 
1982 
49.35 
28.76 
3.93 
4.27 
2.30 
27.33 
1.72 
117.66 
3.3 
1983 
45.53 
47.12 
4.70 
4.69 
2.66 
28.88 
2.00 
135.58 
3.4 
1. Mainly pre-retirement 
2. Compensation for short-time working, payment of allowances to certain categories 
of the population and the "employment/investment" contracts in the textiles 
and clothing industry provided for by the Order of March 1982 
3. Aid to regions tax exemptions, assistance to out-of-work wage-earners to 
set up their own businesses, etc. 
4. Mobility premiums, installation grants to young farmers, income maintenance 
for handicapped workers, etc. 
5. Training of jobseekers and employed persons. 
6. Mainly operating expenditure of the ANPE. 
Source: 0ECD Economic Surveys: France, July 1985 
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The unemployment benefit scheme has been changing drastically over the 
period of this recession. Until 1979 the Central Government provided social 
assistance for an unlimited period while employer/employee trading associa­
tions managed an insurance scheme and distributed allowances for limited dura­
tions. In 19 79 there was a major change and the Central Government contribu­
ted to the Scheme. In 1982, 72% of the registered unemployed (jobseekers) 
were drawing benefits but only 10% received the Special Allowance. 80% of 
those drawing the basic allowance (almost one-half of the jobseekers) 
received less than the minimum wage. In 1984, in response to the rapid 
rise in unemployment compensation, new legislation was brought in to link 
benefits with contributions and at a lower rate. This may stabilise the 
costs of unemployment compensation but at the expense of the unemployed. 
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5.5 Fiscal Costs: Italy 
Our estimates for Italy are extremely crude as we had difficulties in 
finding adequate data. The estimates provided in Table 5.4 are therefore subject 
to an unknown margin of error. The direct tax loss was calculated using 
average earnings. For the indirect tax loss we calculated the average 
propensity to consume and applied it to net average earnings (after direct 
tax and national insurance) and assumed an indirect tax rate of 15%. The 
unemployment benefits include the CIG payments. 
Table 5.4 
Changing Fiscal Costs: Italy 
Billion Lire (Current Prices) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Lost Income/Revenue 
Direct Taxation 
National Insurance 
Indirect Tax (High) 
Expenditure 
Unemployment Benefit (total) 1580 
Total 6598 
% GDP Current Prices 2.44 
250 
968 
800 
4316 
1191 
959 
6419 
1649 
1304 
8590 
2064 
1578 
9896 
2378 
1827 
1580 2589 
8046 11961 
2.38 2.98 
3673 
15905 
3.37 
4341 
.18442 
3.44 
Notes: 1. Source for Unemployment Benefits: Annuario Statistico Italiano 
1984 p. 63, Table 54 
2. Source for Direct Tax loss and National Insurance Contributions: 
0ECD National Account Statistics and OECD Tax Benefit Position of 
a Typical Worker in 0ECD Member Countries (Paris 1983) p. 82. 
3. Source for Indirect taxes: 15% tax on consumer expenditure 
assuming average earnings. 
According to our estimates the fiscal costs of unemployment increased 
from 2.44% to 3.44% from 1979 to 1983. Subject to the qualification made 
above, these estimates seem to be "plausible". 
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5.6 Fiscal Costs: U.K. 
There have been a few studies of fiscal (Exchequer) costs for the U.K. 
An early study was done by H.M.Treasury (Economic Progress Report No. 130, 
February 1981) which carefully set out the assumptions required to carry 
out such an evaluation. The study estimated the fiscal costs of an additional 
100,000 unemployed and it stressed that it would be misleading to simply 
"blow up" their estimates to estimate the costs for the total unemployment. 
This was because the assumptions made for a small change in unemployment would 
be invalid for a large change. (Notwithstanding their cautionary note, the 
estimates have been used by others to estimate the costs of unemployment 
for 2 or 3 millions unemployed people.) They assume that the unemployed 
receive 80% of average earnings and that, for an increase in unemployment 
of 100,000, there is a fall in employment of 133,000 (based on past relation­
ships). Table 5.5 reproduces their results for 1980-81. 
Table 5.5 
Direct Exchequer Costs of an Increase of 100,000 in Registered 
Unemployment (Excluding School-Leavers) in 1980-81 
At 1980-81 outturn priées 
Exchequer costs for 1980-81 
(£m) 
Current receipts 
Income tax 115 
National insurance contributions^ 75 
National insurance surcharge 15 
Total current receipts 205 
Current expenditure 
National insurance benefits (including 65 
earnings related supplement) 
Other social security benefits 55 
Rent and rate rebates 5 
Administrative costs 10 
Total current expenditure 135 
Exchequer cost 340 
1. The fall in income tax is assumed to be 23 percent of the fall in 
wages and salaries. A six-week accruals lag has been allowed for. 
2. Employee and employer contributions, including payments to the 
National Health Service, Redundancy and Maternity Pay Funds. The 
fall in accruals of national insurance contributions before 
allowing for employees who would be contracted out is £100 million 
at unchanged contributions rates. The estimate given here allows 
for accruals adjustment and assumes that 30 percent of the employees 
would have been contracted out of the state pension scheme. 
3. Totals are the rounded sum of unrounded components. 
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In a detailed analysis using microeconomic data from the Family 
Expenditure Survey, Dilnot and Morris (1983Ί calculated the fiscal costs 
for the particular characteristics of the unemployed in 1977/78. Their 
results are more detailed in that they include passport benefits but less 
detailed in that they exclude administrative costs. 
We have produced a set of estimates of fiscal costs using data on 
unemployment by industry and average earnings by industry. We used the 
appropriate tax schedules to calculate direct tax losses and the National 
Insurance rates to calculate NI losses. For indirect taxes we followed 
Dilnot and Morris in assuming that 18% of net earnings would be lost in 
indirect taxes. The direct benefit payments are from published sources. 
We estimated the expenditure on school meals by using information on 
unemployed people with children. The Rate and Rent Rebates were assumed 
to be the same as in Dilnot and Morris. Since 1982 the Government treats 
unemployment benefits as taxable income. According to an answer in Parliament by 
Mr Lawson (Chancellor of the Exchequer) the yield in a full year at 1984/85 
levels from taxing benefits paid to the unemployed is estimated at 
£625 million. (Hansard, 28th February, 1985, Col. 264). We used this to 
work out the gain per unemployed person and then deflated it by the retail 
price index. This was then subtracted from the income tax loss. For 
purposes of comparison we extrapolated Dilnot and Morris' figures to 1982/83 
and 1983/84 by assuming a proportional relationship between numbers 
unemployed and costs in each category. 
These calculations are set out in Table 5.6. The first row of each 
category gives our estimates (labelled PNJ) and the second row of each 
category gives Dilnot and Morris' estimates (labelled D & M). The D & M 
figures for 1982/83 and 1983/84 are simple extrapolations and therefore 
placed in parentheses. According to our estimates, the fiscal costs 
increased from £4,447 millions to £16,768 millions from 1979/80 to 
1983/84: an increase from 2.17% of GDP to 5.49% of GDP. This is not only 
a high fiscal cost but also a very large increase over this period. (Note 
that we have not made an estimate for administrative expenses). 
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Table 5.6 
The Changing Cost of Unemployment: UK 
£m. Current Prices 
1. 
2. 
3. 
BENEFITS 
Unemployment 
D & M 
Supplementary 
D & M 
School Meals 
D & M 
(PNJ) 
(PNJ) 
(PNJ) 
4. Rate & Rent Rebates 
D & M 
Total Benefits (PNJ) 
(PNJ) 
1979/80 
681 
614 
770 
976 
156 
83 
49 
49 
1658 
1980/81 
1328 
1038 
1182 
1659 
233 
141 
101 
101 
2844 
1981/82 
1758 
1646 
2091 
2618 
346 
227 
141 
141 
4336 
1982/83 
1550 
(1906) 
3422 
(2712) 
396 
(230) 
176 
(176) 
5544 
1983/84 
1540 
(1874) 
3468 
(2667) 
430 
(227) 
162 
(162) 
5600 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9 
LO. 
D & M 
TAXES 
Income Tax (PNJ) 
D & M 
National Insurance (PNJ) 
D & M 
Indirect Taxes (PNJ) 
D & M 
Total Tax Loss (PNJ) 
D & M 
Overall Exchequer Cost (PNJ) 
D & M 
% of GDP (PNJ) 
D & M 
1722 
935 
1065 
1024 
872 
832 
584 
2791 
2521 
4447 
4243 
2.17 
2.07 
2938 
1969 
1855 
1740 
1617 
1251 
1396 
4960 
4868 
7804 
7807 
3.30 
3.30 
4632 
• 
3396 
3137 
2923 
2613 
2145 
2565 
8464 
8315 
12800 
12947 
4.92 
4.98 
(5024) 
(3581) 
(3376) 
3678 
(3025) 
3465 
(2282) 
10724 
(8683) 
16268 
(13707) 
5.74 
(4.84) 
(4930) 
(3829) 
(3419) 
4095 
(2974) 
3244 
(2244) 
11168 
(8637) 
16768 
(13567) 
5.49 
(4.44) 
Notes: 1. Data for Rows 1 and 2 are from Annual Abstract 1985. 
T. 3.5 for UK (Current Prices) 
2. Source for D & M estimates are Dilnot & Morris "Estimating the Cost 
of Unemployment". Institute of Fiscal Studies Working Paper No. 27 
(undated, 1983?). Figures in parentheses were crude extrapolations. 
3. Estimates for tax loss and National Insurance from average earnings 
(New Earnings Survey), Employment Gazette and Inland Revenue tax 
schedules. 
4. Estimates of taxes collected from Unemployment benefits were derived 
crudely from a Parliamentary answer by Mr Lawson (28th Feb. 1985, 
Col. 264) by assuming a proportional relation between numbers unem­
ployed and taxation of benefits and then deflated by the retail price 
index. 
5. School meals estimates were derived from an estimate in Social Trends 
15 that the cost per child was in 1982/83 £208.33. We used a retail 
price index to adjust this cost for other years. Estimates of number 
of children unemployed from Eurostat. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
In this Chapter we discussed the importance of measuring the fiscal 
costs of unemployment and the methodology involved in estimating them. 
We provided estimates of these fiscal costs which have grown enormously over 
the recession. It is worth noting that these estimates are all under­
estimates since they ignore second round effects via the multiplier. 
Economic policies that may be introduced at a certain ostensible public 
expenditure level would, in fact, cost less because of the gains from 
increased tax revenues and decreased expenditures on social security. The 
estimates provided in this chapter suggest that it may be worth considering 
economic policies to decrease the level of unemployment. 
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Chapter 6 Individual and Social Costs 
"...we have tried to ... specify and measure precisely 
the replacement rates ... Since we have found this 
exercise difficult, and have used a large amount of 
computer time to do so, it is doubtful if the 
unemployed have actually performed the same 
calculations ..." Dilnot & Morris (1983) 
6.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter we look at the financial, psychological and health costs 
to the individual and finally discuss the social costs of unemployment. 
In spite of what popular accounts in newspapers might suggest, unemployment 
for an individual is a very serious and upsetting condition which imposes 
large costs on the individual as well as on his (her) family. It is 
worth stressing that many of the unemployed would have had low incomes 
when employed, would come from socially disadvantaged backgrounds (poor 
educational and financial resources, ethnic minorities, poor or low 
wuality neighbourhoods, etc.) and, where spells of unemployment occur 
with unfortunate frequency. During this recession, the problem of long 
term unemployment has become very serious: during long spells of unemployment 
individuals suffer not only financially but also physically (health/ morbidity) 
and psychologically. The social costs of unemployment in terms of increased 
social disorder (civil strife/riots) and crime are more difficult to 
establish but, in our opinion, are nonetheless important. 
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6.2 Financial Costs to the Individual 
When an individual becomes unemployed, he loses an income and has to rely 
on financial support from his family and/or on the state. The extent of 
state support varies from country to country as well as on various personal 
circumstances, including the industry/occupation of previous employment. 
Again, State support varies according to whether the individual has previous 
employment experience as well as the duration and earnings of that employment. 
Finally, State support may depend on whether the individual was made 
redundant or dismissed or whether (s)he left the job voluntarily (quit). 
Some State support comes as a fixed sum per week and some comes as a proportion 
of previous income. Some State support comes in the form of payments which 
are conditional on various personal characteristics as well as the individual 
making the effort (physical or psychological) to claim these discretionary 
benefits. 
It is worth noting that when an individual becomes unemployed in the 
current period he loses not only his current income but may also find his 
future income lower than if (s)he had not experienced unemployment. There 
is some evidence to suggest that the probability of finding employment 
decreases with the duration of unemployment. This may be for one of two 
reasons: (a) the employer treats the duration of unemployment as a signal 
of 'negative characteristics' or (b) the worker gives up hope and looks less 
carefully (or frequently) for jobs (decreasing search intensity) or performs 
badly in interviews because of the length of the unemployment spell. It 
is also true that even if (when) an unemployed individual finds work, the 
individual accepts a .job at a lower income and skill level. Another 
reason for the long term unemployed to obtain lower incomes is that their 
skills deteriorate with time and, in some cases, due to technological 
change their skills become obsolescent. It is difficult to find any 
quantitative information on this skill deterioration, other than information on 
lower post unemployment earnings (see Moylan, Millar and Davies (1984)). If 
the individual has had repeated spells of unemployment, then there is little 
progression (if any) in his (her) income profile. In other words, unemployment 
in the current period imposes a financial cost now as well as in the future. 
Financial costs to the individual are often summarised in terms of a 
"replacement ratio" (RR): the ratio of earnings to benefits or, in general 
terms, income in work relative to income when unemployed. (Conventionally 
the financial costs are treated as a ratio rather than the difference 
between income in work and income when unemployed.) In some neoclassical 
maximising models, individuals are assumed to make a rational choice about 
whether to accept a job offer (which every individual receives, or receives 
with some non-zero probability) or to continue looking for a better offer 
while living on unemployment benefits. There are several conceptual and 
measurement problems involved: 
(i) Given that many state benefits (and taxes) are dependent on 
individual circumstances, a typical replacement ratio is difficult 
to define unambiguously. There are a range of those RRs for each 
different circumstance, e.g. single, married, married with 'n' 
children, 
(ii) Replacement ratios may be defined in terms of gross or net earnings 
(net of taxes and national insurance). As taxation is dependent 
on individual (family) circumstances a whole range of RRs can be 
calculated, 
(iii) Earnings in work clearly vary for each individual. Typically, 
the unemployed have low earnings. 
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(iv) RRs may be defined as 'backward' or 'forward' looking RRs. If we 
take the individual's past (actual) net earnings and divide by the 
(actual) benefits received when unemployed for some unit of time, 
we get a backward looking RR. Alternatively, we can define a forward 
looking RR: the expected future earnings stream divided by the 
(expected) future benefits stream. This method requires us to 
define an appropriate time horizon (expected working life?) as well 
as an appropriate discount rate. Some RRs are defined as annual rates, 
i.e. income for part of the year worked plus unemployment benefits 
for part of the year divided by income from work for the whole 
year. In our opinion this latter RR is very misleading. Similarly, 
although a present value RR (discounted benefits divided by discounted 
earnings) may be theoretically satisfying to neoclassical economists 
it is empirically difficult to compute and, perhaps, not relevant 
to the unemployed individual. 
(v) If the RR is calculated on a ' backward' basis for monthly (or 
weekly) periods, then in some countries the RR falls with duration 
because some benefits are reduced or fall to zero after a certain 
length of time. This means we need to provide a time profile of 
RRs"2). 
(vi) There may be a difference between average and marginal RRs, especially 
affected by various tax conditions(3). 
(vii) There are difficulties with whether or not to include discretionary 
benefits (e.g. Free School Meals in the U.K). In some cases we 
may have information on actual benefits received but often authors 
assume a hundred percent take-up of these benefits although it is 
known that take up rates are not that high, 
(viii) Some authors argue that work expenses (e.g. expenses involved in 
getting to work and back) should be subtracted from after tax net 
earnings: this clearly increases an RR. However, work expenses are 
very person specific: do you take sandwiches for lunch or eat in the 
office/factory canteen? 
(ix) Sometimes, instead of an RR for a 'typical' individual, an RR is 
calculated for an average individual. In this latter case a weighted 
average of benefits of all the unemployed are divided by a weighted 
average earnings of all the employed. This is a "macro" measure. 
To some extent, which RR is used depends on what model of individual 
behaviour is assumed and what the purpose is in estimating an RR. Given our 
comments above it is clear that a range of RRs exist and, if any estimates 
are provided, we need to look carefully at the assumptions made and to look 
at all the footnotes carefully.' 
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6.3 Some Estimates of Replacement Ratios 
In this section we provide some estimates produced by various sources 
As mentioned earlier, there are several alternative definitions of RRs 
which may explain the differences in estimates. 
In a recent paper, in the Economic 
1983, Vol 35, No. 3) the United Nations 
provided estimates of RRs for a 'typical 
remains unemployed for a whole year. Es 
of 'typical' workers: (a) Married man wi 
person. The RR is defined as the ratio 
benefits (plus allowances) for a year di 
(gross earnings minus income tax and emp 
These results are presented in Tables 6 
Bulletin for Europe (September 
Economic Committee for Europe 
' worker in manufacturing who 
timates are provided for two kinds 
th 3 dependents and (b) single 
of unemployment net (of tax) 
vided by previous disposable income 
loyee's social security contributions) 
1 and 6.2 
Rep 
F.R.G. 
(a) France 
Italy(a) 
U.K.(b) 
Table 6. 
lacement Ratios for Married 
1972 
70.0 
84.7 
43.6 
75.0 
Source: Economic 
Notes : (a) 
1974 
70.0 
89.0 
41.4 
70.0 
Bulletin 
Benefits are 
1976 1977 
75.2 75.0 
90.6 91.6 
43.6 45.1 
74.5 74.8 
1 
Man wi 
1978 
74.7 
92.2 
46.4 
69.0 
th 3 Dependents 
Percent 
1979 
74.7 
92.2 
47.7 
66.5 
for Europe (Sept. 1983, Vol. 
those payable 
1980 
74.7 
93.8 
46.7 
59.4 
35, No, 
1981 
74.9 
91.2 
47.6 
56.7 
. 3)T 3 
1982 
75.0 
90.0 
47.0 
47.0 
.1 
when redundancy is due to economic 
reasons. If the unemployment was due to other reasons, the 
RR for France would be 60.2 in 19 72 and 64.0 in 1982. In Italy 
it would be 17.7 in 1972 and 19.0 in 1982. The figures for 
Italy include wife's allowances but exclude child allowance 
which was Lit 19,760 per child in 1981. If these were included, 
the 1981 RR would be 52.3 percent. 
(b) Benefits exclude allowances for school meals, free milk, rent 
and tax rebates. Years are financial years. 
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Table 6.2 
Replacement Ratios for Single Person 
Percent 
1972 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
F.R.G. 
France 
Italy 
U.K. 
62.5 
84.7 
39.0 
53.9 
62.5 
89.0 
37.6 
48.4 
68.0 
90.6 
38.6 
50.4 
68.0 
91.6 
38.9 
51.4 
68.0 
92.2 
39.9 
47.3 
68.0 
92.2 
40.5 
44.6 
68.0 
93.8 
41.2 
39.5 
68.0 
91.2 
42.0 
37.0 
68.0 
90.0 
42.2 
26.0 
Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe (Sept. 1983, Vol. 35 No. 3) Τ 3.2 
Notes : See Notes to Τ 6.1 
There is quite a wide variation over countries and especially for the 
U.K. a substantial decline over the period in question. These RRs for so-
called 'typical' workers may not be those relevant for many workers because 
they may not have the appropriate 'qualifications' (e.g. adequate employment 
history) to be eligible for these benefits. The estimates for Italy 
(presumably) include payments under the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni (CIG) 
as a footnote makes clear that the RR is very low in other cases. In Italy 
the unemployment benefits excluding CIG are very low and presumably 
family support has to take the place of State support. 
P. Roberti (in 0ECD 1984) has provided estimates of an RR defined as 
income earned plus unemployment benefits in one year divided by annual income 
assuming unemployment spells of 3 and 6 months. These RRs are obviously 
higher because they include earnings for 9 and 6 months (respectively) 
in the numerator. These estimates are provided for 'typical' workers as 
in the UN estimates. These results are given in Table 6.3. 
These RRs look surprisingly high but are misleading. They include earnings 
for part of the year in the numerator*(in addition to unemployment benefits) 
and are annual RRs. It seems more appropriate, in our view, to quote an RR 
on a weekly or monthly basis where the numerator is solely unemployment 
(plus other) benefits. 
In the 0ECD Employment Outlook 1984, RRs are presented on the basis 
of unemployment benefits to net earnings for different income levels and for 
different unemployment durations, (see Charts 18 & 19, pp. 94-95). In almost 
all cases the RRs fall substantially after 12 months unemployment duration 
as people move off the unemployment benefits to (the equivalent of) 
supplementary benefits. In Germany unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) 
are paid for a maximum of 312 days (depending on length of previous employment) 
after which the unemployed receive supplementary benefits (Arbeitslosenhilfe). 
In France the basic allowance is paid for three years while in Italy it is 
for 180 days a year (or 360 days in the building sector). In the UK, 
unemployment benefits are paid for a year after which individuals move on to 
means tested supplementary benefits. A recent report by the UK Department of 
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Table 6.3 
Replacement Ratios: OECD estimates 
Unemployment 
(Months) 
RR 
Single 
RR Married & 3 Dependents 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Federal Republic 
of Germany 
France 
Italy 
U.K 
Source: 
19 78 
3 
6 
1980 
3 
6 
1978 
3 
6 
1980/81 
3 
6 
Roberti i 
96.3 
88.5 
98.9 
96.6 
77.9 
54.7 
86.7 
73.8 
94.0 
88.3 
98.9 
96.6 
85.0 
61.8 
91.8 
85.3 
Notes : 1. These are ratios of annual disposable incomes of production 
workers experiencing 3 or 6 months of unemployment to those 
experiencing no unemployment. The estimates quoted above 
are for those on average earnings, for those on 66% or 
200% of average earnings, see Source. 
2. Figures for Italy exclude construction workers and CIG. 
Health and Social Security (see Moylan, Millar and Davies (1984)) discusses 
the difference in replacement ratios for different families, and changes over 
time in the RRs. 
1984, 
To conclude this section, we quote from the 0ECD Employment Outlook 
" ... the results of this analysis cast doubt on the popular 
belief that a spell of unemployment has little personal 
financial cost." (p. 96). 
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6.4 Physical and Mental Health Costs 
In this section we briefly review the evidence of the impact of unemploy­
ment on the physical and mental health of individuals. One of the main pro­
blems in evaluating the evidence is that the direction of causation is 
difficult to determine: does poor health cause unemployment or does unemploy­
ment cause poor health? The other main point worth stressing is that there 
are a range of individual responses to the experience of unemployment. 
Although it is difficult to substantiate with evidence, our opinion is that 
the individual response to unemployment is affected by the global economic 
conditions: if all (or most) of your colleagues and friends are unemployed, 
then you may not feel as depressed as if you are one of the few experiencing 
unemployment: the stigma of unemployment may vary with the overall level of 
unemployment. 
In modern industrial society, employment provides not only an income, 
but also a set of social relationships which provide a structure and meaning 
to life. Thus when an individual becomes unemployed (s)he loses an income 
and is usually worse off: these are the financial costs discussed above. 
However, the breakdown in social relationships can lead to the individual 
suffering mentally and physically. If life has no objective or purpose, 
the individual, in a sense, lets his (her) defences lapse and, as a result, 
may succumb more easily to physical illness. 
(4) In a recent paper Jahoda & Rush (1980) state the importance of 
employment thus: 
"On the individual level the latent consequences of unemploy­
ment can be regarded as the absence of the latent consequences 
of employment. Five such consequences have been identified in 
the literature. Employment of whatever kind at whatever level 
makes the following categories of psychological experiences 
inevitable: it imposes a time structure on the waking day; 
it compels contacts and shared experiences with others 
outside the nuclear family; it demonstrates that there are 
goals and purposes which are beyond the scope of an 
individual, but require a collectivity; it imposes status 
and social identity through the division of labour in modern 
employment and, last but not least, it enforces activity." 
In an interesting and much quoted paper, Harrison (19 76) discusses the 
findings from some of the earlier studies. He states that those with a past 
history of employment go through a sequence of stages: shock ­*■ optimism ­*­
pessimism -► fatalism. This is represented graphically: 
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Diagram 6.1 
MORALE 
THE EXPERIENCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
MONEY 
WORRIES 
^ FATALISM 
An appropriate way of studying the impact of unemployment on physical 
and mental health of the individual would be to carry out longitudinal studies 
of the unemployed with a control group of the employed. The UK Department 
of Health and Social Security Cohort Study^ was a short period of longitudinal 
study which inquired about health but did not have a control group. On the 
basis of self reporting the evidence does not support the view that health 
of the unemployed deteriorates with unemployment duration. They did find, 
however, that the probability of finding a job decreases with ill-health. 
However, as they are aware, this study has limitations because of the absence 
of a control group and the attrition rate of the cohort. Brinkmann, (1984) 
reporting on a longitudinal study by the Institute for Employment Research 
(IAB, Nürnberg) found that the long term unemployed showed increased signs 
of ill health, particularly mental health. 
An as yet unpublished World Health Organisation Report concludes that: 
"A significantly higher prevalence of mental disorders have 
been found in the unemployed..." 
"Unemployment is therefore considered by many as a major source 
of stress." 
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"Chronic stress is now considered a major contributor to 
cardiovascular diseases, ulcers, asthma and other diseases." 
In a study, Moser, Fox and Jones (1984) conclude on the basis of a 
longitudinal study for the UK that the mortality rates for unemployed men 
was higher than for all men. They also conclude that there is little 
evidence that this could be explained by ill-health leading to unemployment. 
Thus, we find that there is evidence that unemployment increases the 
probability of physical or mental illness'°'. 
Most of the studies suggest that these problems increase with duration 
of unemployment. The long term unemployed suffer more than the short term 
unemployed. 
Before concluding this section we should note that the individual 
costs (whether financial, physical or mental health) would depend to some 
extent on whether the unemployed individual was a young person who had 
never worked before, was made redundant or was a voluntary quit. Again, 
individual responses differ to the same circumstances: some manage to cope 
with the experience of unemployment and enjoy the leisure (at least for some 
time) while for some it is a shattering experience. 
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6.5 Social Costs 
Most of the aggregative studies of the social costs of unemployment 
using time series data, have been controversial. As such all these results 
are tentative and subject to revision in the light of further work. In 
this section we briefly review the studies that find a relationship between 
unemployment and mortality and unemployment and crime. 
Brenner (19 79) argues that unemployment (and the risk of redundancy) 
leads to stress and cardiovascular morbidity and, hence, leads to increased 
mortality rates. He argues that trend factors like economic 
growth and improved public health, have decreased mortality rates. Using 
regression analysis on time series data on England and Wales, 1936 to 1973 
he found a significant positive relation between age specific mortality rates 
and unemployment. A second degree polynomial lag structure on unemployment 
was used in the analysis. This study has been criticised severely by Gravelle, 
Hutchinson and Stern (1981) on statistical grounds. They argue Brenner's 
model is incorrectly specified, the variables are poorly measured and 
the results are a statistical artifact of the time period chosen. When 
tests of structural stability were carried out, Brenner's results break down. 
They argue that although they do not necessarily disagree with the view that 
unemployment affects morbidity and mortality, the time series evidence is 
not conclusive*- ^ . 
An analysis of the links between unemployment and crime is especially 
difficult because the concept of crime itself depends on political and 
social attitudes in general and that of the police and judiciary in 
particular. Unemployment is said to lead to crime by economists because the 
opportunity costs of time are low for the unemployed so it is 'rational' 
to increase their incomes by (property) crimes. Sociologists and 
criminologists argue that unemployment leads to a sense of alienation or 
anomie which causes .. jcra^ion and aggression which breaks out into crimes. 
Most of the time series and cross section work has been criticised severely 
and the results of a positive link are only suggestive. In an important 
work, Carr-Hill and Stern (1979) found that when variables, other than 
unemployment, were introduced (e.g. rateable values) that the results were 
weakened. In a preliminary paper by this author, Junankar (1984) , the 
same support was found for a link between youth unemployment and youth r 
crime in England and Wales. Overall, many authors believe there is a link 
but argue that to show this in econometric models is very difficult. 
Another social cost of unemployment is the possibility of social strife 
and civil riots. Most of the civil riots in Britain in the post-war 
period have taken place in high unemployment areas: Liverpool, Brixton (in 
London), Bristol etc. The House of Lords Select Committee Report on 
Unemployment (1982) states 
"We believe unemployment to be among the causes of ill health, 
mortality, crime or civil disorder" (p. 59) 
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6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter we discussed the costs of unemployment to the individual 
and to society. Unemployment imposes a substantial financial cost on the 
unemployed person and his (her) family. Although we have emphasised the 
costs to the individual, it is clear that the family suffers both financially 
and psychologically. There are increased tensions in the family which may 
lead to breakdown of marriages. Not only the unemployed individual suffers 
from unemployment: so does the employed individual. The employed individual 
finds it more difficult to find another better (more satisfying, better paid, 
etc.) job: job mobility is decreased. In addition, because of the threat of 
unemployment, the employed individual can be coerced into increased 
intensity of effort by the management. Because of the changed balance of 
power, employers may resist demands for increased wages (or not grant 
increases in line with inflation) and hence employed individuals suffer from 
unemployment. The longer the duration of unemployment, the greater these 
costs. In addition, long term unemployment is likely to increase mental 
and physical illness and, in extreme cases, lead to attempted suicides. 
Unemployment also leads to an increased mortality rate. There is evidence 
to suggest that unemployment leads to increased crime and possibly to 
social disorders and civil riots. 
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Footnotes to Chapter 6. 
1. See P. Roberti "Unemployment Compensation Replacement Rates" in OECD 
(1984) High Unemployment: A Challenge for Income Support Policies. 
Also see OECD Employment Outlook 1984, Ch. 6. 
2. See OECD Employment Outlook 1984, p. 95. 
3. See Atkinson et al. (1984), Journal of Public Economics. 
4. M.Jahoda and H. Rush "Work, Employment and Unemployment: An Overview of 
Ideas and Research Results in the Social Science Literature", 
University of Sussex, Science Policy Research Unit: Research Paper 1980 
p. 11. 
5. See S. Ramsden and C. Smee "The health of Unemployed Men: DHSS Cohort 
Study", Employment Gazette, September 1981, pp. 397-401. 
6. S.Piatt and N. Kreitman, "Parasuicide and Unemployment in Edinburgh, 
1968-82", find that unemployment increases the parasuicide rate. 
7. Also see Gravelle (1984) and Forbes and McGregor (1984). Jürgen John 
(1983) in a preliminary analysis for West Germany finds some support for 
a positive relation between mortality rates and unemployment. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
"Prolonged unemployment is for most people a profoundly 
corrosive experience, undermining personality and 
atrophying work capacities." Harrison (1976) 
7.1 Introduction 
In this Report we have discussed the costs of unemployment to society 
in terms of loss of output, to the Government in terms of lost revenue 
(fiscal costs) and to the individual (in terms of lost income as well as 
physical and mental health costs) and briefly costs to society in terms 
of morbidity, mortality and crime. There is overwhelming evidence that 
unemployment imposes a very high cost. In this Chapter we discuss some 
of the broader policy questions and implications for future research: 
(i) Why do Governments not take active policy measures to reduce 
unemp1oymen t ? 
(ii) What policy measures can the Government introduce? 
(iii) Implications for future research 
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7.2 Constraints on Government Policy 
Given that unemployment is so high and still increasing, why do 
Governments not engage in active policies to slow down or reverse this trend 
in unemployment? Unemployment imposes such high costs: a loss of output 
of at least 10 percent of GDP, a loss to public revenues of 3 to 6 percent 
of GDP and a financial loss to individuals of about 20 to 30 percent of 
earnings plus mental and physical health costs. Why do Governments not 
intervene to improve the situation? Do they think that these costs are 
not real or do they think they are exaggerated? 
The answers to these questions lie in the realms of economics, 
politics and in the philosophy of social science. Some Governments believe 
in the ideas of a group of economists labelled the 'New Classical' school. 
This group of economists believes that the economy consists of perfectly 
competitive firms with individuals acting in a non-collusive manner. Prices 
are assumed to adjust instantaneously and individuals are assumed to have 
'rational expectations' (that is individuals form expectations about various 
variables, e.g. inflation rates, which are on average correct). Under some 
very restrictive assumptions it can be shown that Government policy is 
ineffectived) . Some Governments have latched on to this economic model 
to justify their view that laissez faire free enterprise works wonders: 
all that is required is to remove institutional constraints imposed by 
Government economic policy and Trade unions. On the whole this extreme 
model in economics is losing adherents and most economists would accept 
that Governments can have some influence on the real variables in the 
economy (e.g. on unemployment, GDP, etc.). 
A second reason why some (all?) Governments have not taken active steps 
to reduce unemployment is based on versions of "monetarism". Active Govern­
ment policy, they argue, would lead to increased money supply and hence to 
increased inflation rates. Inflation is said to be a 'social evil' (although 
it is difficult to find what real economic costs are imposed by inflation 
in a monetarist economic model) and hence to be avoided at any cost. 
A third reason, based on the idea that there is a trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment ("Phillips Curve") is that active Government 
policy would reduce unemployment but "stoke the fires of inflation". There is 
much debate in the theoretical and empirical literature about Phillips curves. 
However, the empirical evidence on Phillips curves is certainly questionable. 
In particular, with unemployment at historically unprecedented levels (except 
for the great depression of the nineteen thirties) it is unclear whether 
an increase in Government investment would have much effect on the 
inflation rates. 
A fourth reason, for Government inaction, is that reflation by one 
country on its own would lead to a growth of imports, balance of payment 
deficits etc. This, however, suggests that there should be a coordinated 
response by the European Community to tackle the problem of unemployment. 
A fifth reason is that bouts of unemployment may be necessary to alter 
the balance of industrial power between workers and management to stimulate 
the profit rate and hence investment. The post-war economic scene was one 
of high levels of employment which increased the power of unions and hence 
- 73 -
led to increased earnings putting pressure on profit rates. Large 
corporations may be able to 'weather the storm' while small firms go under 
during a recession: weaker inefficient firms would close down in a Darwinian 
survival of the fittest. 
Thus there are several reasons why a Government may not enact economic 
policies to expand the economy. However, we feel that the problem of 
unemployment is now so serious that a mild expansion of the economy would 
not entail any harmful effects. We now turn to some policy matters. 
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7.3 Policy Implications 
Our report has stressed the very high costs of unemployment and we 
briefly consider some economic policies. Given the high level of unemploy­
ment we feel that there is need for a concerted and coordinated reflation 
of the economies of the European Community. These policies should involve 
an expansion of Government investment in projects that are labour 
intensive, use mainly unskilled workers, e.g. construction activities to 
replace old housing stock, hospitals, schools etc. 
In addition to increased public investment, the Government should 
expand various job creation/training schemes. Studies by Reyher, Koller 
and Spitznagel·^) (1980) demonstrate that the fiscal costs of these policies 
for West Germany are very low because of the savings on employment , _, 
compensation and gains from increased tax revenues. The House of Lords 
(1982) found that the net costs of various economic policies were small 
relative to the Gross costs. Thus policies to provide employment subsidies 
to firms taking on long-term unemployed people would be especially important. 
To evaluate alternative policies would involve some fairly detailed 
estimation but illustrative studies mentioned above show the feasibility 
of these schemes. Our estimates of the fiscal costs of unemployment are 
an important argument in favour of these policies. 
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7.4 Implications for Future Research 
There are several avenues of future research implied by the work in 
this Report. Firstly, and ideally, we should evaluate the costs of 
unemployment to society in terms of a macroeconometric model specified for 
each country. Within the model structure, we simulate the impact of a 
particular economic policy (e.g. increased Government expenditure, decreased 
taxation etc.) on output, employment, fiscal revenues, inflation, etc. In 
this way we can estimate the output gain relative to the decrease in 
unemployment, the change in fiscal revenues relative to the decrease in 
unemployment and the increase (?) in inflation relative to the decrease in 
unemployment. Secondly, further research is necessary on how to aggregate 
the costs and benefits to society. Thirdly, much work needs to be done 
on the costs to the individual depending on how (s)he became unemployed: 
redundancy, dismissal or voluntary quit. In addition, these individual 
costs would be affected by family circumstance as well as by whether the 
peer group is similarly affected. Fourthly, the social costs in terms of 
increased morbidity, mortality and of crime is still a very controversial 
area which needs more longitudinal studies. Finally, much work needs to 
be done on dynamic costs of unemployment in terms of output loss, skill 
deterioration and, generally long-term consequences of a continued high 
rate of unemployment. The consequences on young people who have never had 
work since leaving school is an area of especial concern. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
We believe that the continued high levels of unemployment impose a 
serious cost on individuals and society. In our opinion, Governments must 
intervene actively in the economy to bring down the levels of unemployment, 
Even if there is a slight increase in inflation rates, we feel it is a 
price worth paying. There is a way of running a society which does not 
condemn millions of people to a hopeless state of unemployment: the way 
forward is to have a coordinated and concerted expansion of the economies 
of the European Community. 
ANNEX 1 
^ihlìQiìLEPìty.. 
[l J G^AK^ERLOF 
"A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment 
may be thn Consequen' e". Quarter ly ­Journal of 
^.f2.9..r!.9£LLt:.:..rI J u n e 1 9ö 0 , ρ ρ . 749­777 
An important contribution to labour economics in providing a 
theoretical rationale for the binding nature of social 
customs. Social custom prevents an employer from hiring labour 
at a wage less than the current one even with the existence of 
unemployment. 
[2 ] L·. ALJLEÍL JL- Δ J2I.Ì.Y INS 0 Ν 
An Introduction to the Italian Economy, Ma r t i η 
R o b ertsοη, Lοη dοη, 19 74. 
This book describes and analyses the main features and issues 
of the Italian·economy and its development over the post­war 
period. Comparisons are made with other countries, 
particularly the UK. It examines the factors behind Italy's 
rapid post; war economic growth and success with its balance 
of payments (until 1972). Also studied are labour market 
changes and industrial relations, the problem of the 
u η d e r d e ν e 1 o ρ e d S o u th, a η d t. h e c o η t r i b u tion of t fi e s t a t e 
industrial holding sector and fiscal and monetary policies, to 
ove r a 11 e c ο η ο m i c ρ e r f o r (nance. 
[3] J.R.ARTUS 
"Measures of Potential. Output in Manufacturing for 
Eight Industrial Countries, 1955­1978" LvilJiJltilLC. 
Papers 198,ρ.1 3 5. 
Discusses concept of potential output and suggests that 
production function approaches (with appropriate estimation) 
i s b e s t m e t h od. F' r o v i d es e m ρ i rie a 1 e s t. i. m a t e s using g u a r t e r 1 y 
d a t a for M a η u f a c t u r i ri g Ind u s t ry. Ν o t e h e s t r" e s s e s t hi a t 
"potential output" is not necessarily "optimal output" because 
of social objectives in terms of controlling inflation or 
a f f e c t i η g b a 1 a η c e o f ρ a y m e η t s. 
M A.B.ATKINSON 
"Uη e mρ1οy meη t B en e f i t s­ Ιη ceη ti v e s" LSE Dis c us si οη 
Paper no 11, July 1980. 
Revised version of paper prepared for HM Treasury in Feb. 
1978. Ch.5, Economics of Unemployment in GreatBritain (ed. J. 
Gre e d y ) . An a I y s i s o f ρ o s s i b ï e e f f e c t o f u ri e m ρ ï o y m e r 11 b e n e f i t 
on r ole of u η empi o y e d . C i a i m ' · 'cl ' 'o ross s e c t i o η evi. d e η c e 
appears to find a significant effect of benefits on industrial 
probabilities of re­employment but magnitude relatively small. 
Says little ground to suppose introduction of Earnings Related 
Supplement led to any avalanche of claims or that its 
abolition will dramatically reduce level of unemployment. 
[5] A.B.ATKINSON, J.GOMULKA, J.MICKLEURIGHT & Ν.RAU 
"Unemployment Benfit, Duration and Incentives in 
Britain: How Robust is the Evidence? Journal of 
Public Economics 23, 1984, pp. 3­26. 
Reviews the evidence that unemployment benefits increase the 
duration of unemployment (as derived from search models). 
They find that substituting the hypothetical benefits by the 
actual the actual benefits received leads to a breakdown of 
the relationship between unemployment and benefits. 
[6] (ed.) MARTIN N. BAILY & ARTHUR M. OKUN 
The Battle Against Unemployment and Inflation: 
Problems of the Modern Economy. W.W.Norton & Co. New 
York, 1982. 
Various essays on relationship between inflation and 
unemployment with 3 essays on fiscal and monetary policy. Main 
interest is the Okun paper "Potential GNP: Its Nature and 
Significance (pps. 11­20) in which he spells out "Okun's Law": 
"In the post­war period, on the average, each extra percentage 
point in the unemployment rate above 4% has been associated 
with about, a 3% decrement in real GDP". He defines natural 
rate of unemployment as 4%. 
M B ASEVI , G . , O . BLANCHARD , U . BUITER , R . DORNBjJSÇH_ .& 
R_,LAYARD^ . 
"Macroeconomic Prospects and Policies for the 
E u to ρ e a η C o m m u η i t. y " , C α m m i s s i o n o f t h e E u rop e a η 
Communities Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs, Economic Papers No. 12, April 
1985. 
Argue that there is no e v.i de? η c e that, unemployment is a real 
wage problem but is the outcome of monetary and fiscal 
policies. They argue for an expansion in demand. 
[δ] G .BENEDETTI, Β .GUI, F. NERI 
"Discussioni e Attualità. La Cassa Integrazioni 
Guadagni nel mercato del lavoro Italiano: 
caratteristiche e costi degli interventi ordinari e 
straordinari".Revista di Politica Economica, 
Gennaio, 1985. 
This article explains how the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
(Cig) operates and how it has altered from its original form, 
which was only intended to deal with temporary falls in labour 
demand. Some of the benefits and problems of the system ate 
examined, in particular the rising cost to the government of 
payments through Interventi Straordinari. Projections of the 
estimated cost of the? Cig through to 1990 are made under two 
different sets of assumptiions regarding employment and 
unemployment levels. The political implications of the effect 
of the Cig on labour relations are also considered. 
[9] G_._BO.PJ¡!. 
"Demand for la b o u r i n 11 alia n i n d u s t. r y ( 19 7 0 ­­ 8 0 " , 
AEELiëii_lÏ££QP.iï!.iÇ.:.§. Vol. 16, 1984, pp. 583­595. 
Some alternative models of labour demand are applied to 
11 alian i ri d u s t r y , ex c 1 u d i η g c ο η s t r u c t i o η , f r o m 19 7 0 t o 19 Θ 0. A 
t r a d i t i o η a 1 C o b b ­ D o u g .1. a s s ρ e c i f i c a t i o η ρ e r f o r m e d 
s a ti. s f a c t o r i ly. A g e ri e r a 1 i ζ e d ρ r ο d u c: t i o n f u n c t i o n i n t r o d u c: e d 
to overcome some limitations in the estimation procedure for 
the simpler model implied positive but decreasing marginal 
productivity of labour. The results showed a rapid speed of 
adjustment of hours in Italy, 75 to 82% of the gap between 
desired and actual values is closed in two quarters, although 
there is very high rigidity of employment levels. 
[ίο] BLANCHARD, P., R.DORNBUSH, J.PREZE, H.GIERSCH, 
R.LAYARD and M.MONTI 
"Report, of the CEPS Macroeconomia Policy Group, 
Employment and Growth in Europe: A Two-Handed 
Approach. Commission of the European Communities, 
Directorate General for Economic and Social. Affairs, 
Economic Papers No. 36, June 1985. 
Argue that proximate cause of growth in unemployment is a lack 
of demand. Recommend expansion of demand and supply-side 
friendly policies. 
D­1] BLAUSTEIN, S.J & I.CRAIG 
An In terna t ion Review of Un empi o y m e ri t Ι η s u r an e: e 
!3í:h.Ç..!n.£;2.' Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E.Upjohn Institute , 
1977. 
A review of the main features of social insurance benefits for­
mest of the industrialised countries in the mid­seventies. 
[ l2j BRENNER, M. Harvey 
"Influence of the Social Environment on 
Psychopathology" in James E. Barrett et al. (eds.) 
Stress and Mental Disorder (Raven Press, Ν.Y. 1979). 
[13] BRENNERjJH 
"Mortality & the National Economy: A Review of the 
Experience of England and Wales, 1936­76". The 
Lancet, September 15th, 1979, pp. 568­573. 
An important paper that argues that economic instability leads 
to stress and affects cardiovascular mortality. Uses some 
cross­section data and some time series data to show that, 
mortality rates increase with unemployment. See Gravelie, 
Hutchinson & Stern (198.1) for a critique of statistical 
methods. 
[14] BRENNER, H & Anne Mooney (1983) 
"Unemployment, and Health in the Context of Economic 
Change". Social Science and Medicine Vol 1.7:16, pp. 
1125­1138. 
[153 BRINKMANN, C 
"Financial, Psycho­Social and Health Problems 
Associated with Unemployment" in T h e F u t u re o f UI o r k : 
C h a 11 e η g e & 0 ρ ρ o r t υ η i t. y ( e c i. ) G. F r a g η i e r e, Van 
Gorcurn ­ Assen/Maastricht, Nether land 1984. 
Reports on results from a longitudinal study begun in 1981 in 
G e r many. Provi d e s e ν i d e η c e o f ci e t r i m e η t a 1 e f f e c t s o n h e a 11 h 
(part i c u 1 a r 1 y men t a 1 ) o f 1 ο η g t. e r m u η e m ρ 1 o y m e ΓΊ t. 
[lo] G _, B.R IS C OEj._f.., 0. '__Bi RI ΕΉ „& ..IL.I.- S. MYTH 
"The Me a s u r e m e η t ο f C a ρ a c i t y U t. i 1 i s a t i o η i η t ti e UK." 
Manchester School, Vol. 38(2), June 1970, pp. 91-
117. 
This paper examines five different ways of measuring levels of 
capacity utilisation (including a Wharton method and 
production function method).There is a surprising degree of 
s i m i .1. a r i t y in t h e d i f f e r e η t i η d i c e s. 
[l7] B R U N O , M. 
"Aggregcite Supply and Demand Factors in OECD 
Unemployed: an Update". Conference on the Rise in 
Unemployment, White House Conference Centre, 
Chelwood Gate, Sussex, 27-31 May 1985. 
Time series regression on OECD countries suggest, a rise in the 
wage gap by 1% increases unemployment by 0.15% within 2 years, 
while a 1% fall in rate of growth of real money stock leads to 
a rise in unemployment by 0.06% after a year. 
[lo] BRUNO, S 
"The Industrial Reserve Army, Segmentation and the 
Italian Labour Market". Cambridge Journal of 
Economics. Vol. 3, 1979, pp. 131-151. 
[19] BLUTER, W 
"The Macroeconomics of Dr. Pangloss: A Critical 
Survey of the New Classical Macroeconomics", 
Economic Journal, Vo1. 90, No.357, Mar c h 1980, 
pp.34-50. 
An early paper that, showed that the New Classical result, of 
policy ineffectiveness was based on a very restrictive model. 
[20] !üj ­H ­ B1JITER_.&. M ■ MILLER 
The Thatcher Experiment. Brookings Papers 2: 1981 
Analyse current, recession in the UK under headings 1) 
Ρ r o d u c t i o ri, a g g r e g a t. e d e m a η d a η d d e m a η d c o m ρ o η e η t s ; 2 ) 
unemployment & labour productivity; 3) wages & prices; 4) the 
current account competitiveness and the exchange rate. Then 
proceeds to discuss monetary control in UK, the medium term 
financial strategy, the monetary squeeze and fiscal policy, 
r o le CÌ f Not't. h S e a oil. Ma i η i η t e r e s t i s s h o r t s e c t i o η ( ρ. 
3 2 6 7 ) on unemployment & labour productivity where they note 
that both labour productivity & unemployment higher in 1981 
than Okun's Law would suggest,. Suggest, two explanations ­
increase in cyclically adjusted level of productivity (result 
of current, policy) and labour hoarding that lessens measured 
Ρ r o d u c t i v i t. y . May f a v o u r s e c ο η d expia η a t. i. o η . 
[2 Ij W.H .BUI TER & M.H.MILLER 
Changing the Rules. Brookings Papers 2: 1983. 
3 main sections 1) profile of recent economic levels in UK 
with a review of taxes & spending under MTFS 2) effectiveness 
of anti­inflation policy & of productivity breakthrough policy 
3) probability of abandonment of stabilization policy. Main 
interest p. 337 which tabulates crude estimate of conventional 
output gap of c. 29 percentage point years of potential GDP by 
1983.1.3% p.a.trend gap observed 1973­9. Then proceeds to 
discuss trade off between inflation & unemployment. 
[22] MARK CASSON 
Youth Unemployment, Macmillan, 1979 
Coverage: W.Germany, Italy, UK mid 70's to late 70's. Ch. 4 
useful in its analysis of theories of youth unemployment. Ch 
6 discusses some explanation of youth unemployment. Main 
point. ­ uses biennial EEC Labour Force Sample Survey. 
[23] CENTRE D'ETUDE PES REVENUES ET DES COUTS (CERC) 
" L ' I η d e m η .1 s a t. i o η d u C h o m a g e e η F ran c e e t 
§J._.l§..t?.'.â.Q'3.§.f­'..^. Document no. 6 2 , CERC 2 e trimestre, 
1982. 
Replacement ratios calculated for Canada, France, Germany, 
Sweden and the UK. 
[2*] COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Rapid Information on Employment Benefits V/355/80 -
EN, Sept. 1978. 
Cites number receiving which particular type of benefit 
according to duration of unemployment. 
C25] COOK, D . G . , R.O. CUMMINS, R.O.BARTLEY & A.G.SHAPER 
(1982) 
"Health of Unemployed Middle-Aged Men in G.B". The 
Lancet 5th June,1982,pp. 1290-1294. 
[26] (ED) BERNARD CRICK 
Unemployment, Methuen 1981. 
Selection of 12 essays covering socio-political aspects of 
contemporary unemployment in this country. Strong regional 
orientation with emphasis "on the extent of unemployment in 
the different regions ... on its social effect and on its 
probable political consequences". 
[27] W.W.PANIEL 
The Nature of Current Unemployment.British North 
American Research Association Occasional Paper No. 
6.Sept. 1981. 
Coverage: GB 1970-1981. Piscussion of composition & 
characteristics of the unemployed, "Emphasis of the paper is 
upon trends, developments & issues rather than upon 
prescriptions"(p. 3). 
[28J M.PARPI 
"Contratto di lavoro, Licenziamenti e Cassa 
Integrazione", Rivista Internazionate di Scienze 
Sociale, Parts 2/3, 1983, pp. 375-401. 
This article examines the effect, of the Cassa Integrazione 
(CI) by building a theoretical model which assumes sackings 
and reduction of labour are two separate decisions. The main 
conclusions are that through the CI there is a transfer of 
funds from the state to firms which allows them to finance 
excess capacity. What is emphasised is not so much the 
insurance of workers' incomes but. the almost free insurance of 
firm's incomes. It is recognised that not everyone would 
agree with the theoretical basis of this model which, instead 
of using comparative static analysis of the situations with 
and without the CI, assumes that in the absence of the CI 
workers and firms would develop private institutions that 
would avoid the problems arising from restrictive employment 
contracts. 
&9] D.H.DAVIES, A.P.L.MINFORD & A.SPRAGUE 
The IFS Position on Unemployment Benefits. Fiscal 
Studies No. l.Vol. 4 March 1983. 
Reiterate crucial role played by benefits. Maintains Kay & 
Morris underestimate this since they undervalue passport 
benefits. Calculate replacement income (-3 £119 p.w. and £114 
for short term- long term unemployed respectively at Nov. 
1982. Claim that 13% of the labour force not significantly 
better off out of work long term. Declare that. vast, mass of 
unemployed are involuntarily excluded from the union sector 
but. voluntarily abstaining from entering the non union sector 
C30] A.M. DILNOT & C.N.MORRIS 
The Exchequer Costs of Unemployment, Fiscal 
Studies.Vol. 2, No. '3,November 1981. 
Published version of the IFS Piscussion Paper No. 27. 
[31] A.W.PILNOT & C.N.MORRIS 
Estimating the Cost of Unemployment. IFS Working 
Paper No. 27. 
Calculation of exchequer cost, of unemployment using the Family 
Expenditure Survey 1977 and on che New Earnings Survey of 1977 
as basic source material. 
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L32J A.W .DILNOT & C.N.MORRIS 
"Private Costs and Benefits of Unemployment: 
Measuring Replacement Rates" Oxford Economic Papers 
Vol. 35(4) 1983 pp. 645-664. 
Argue that although it is possible to define replacement rates 
in theory, in practice they are very difficult, to measure. 
Distinguish between average, marginal, short and long term 
replacemenmt rates. Emphasise differences in RR for different 
i n d i ν i d u al ci r c: u m s t. a η ces. 
[33J "Employment and Concealed Economy" (Parts I & II) 
Italy: Documents and Notes, Year XXX, Nos. 13 & 14, 
1982 
These two articles consider various aspects of the Italian 
economy related to education and labour supply. The Italian 
education system is not geared to the needs of industry and 
young people are not willing to enter skilled manual 
occupations. Some young people would prefer part-time working 
but. employment legislation restricts its availability., 
Various aspects of the black economy and double job holding 
are described and the problems that these cause in estimating 
true unemployment levels are considered. Other problems of 
the Italian labour force and education system are examined, 
using illustrative material rather than a comprehensive 
national assessment, and some solutions are suggested. 
[34] EUROPEAN TRADE UNION INSTITUTE 
The Economic Costs of Unemployment in Western 
Europe, Brussels, 1984. 
Covers output costs, financial (exchequer) costs and the cost 
for the individual. Uses Okun's Law. Useful in providing 
comparative estimatees for EEC countries. 
[35] EUROSTAT 
Employment and Unemployment Statistical Bulletin 
No. 2, 1983. 
11 
Data: structure of unemployment in EEC from Oct. 1979 to Oct. 
1982. 
D6J LEONARD FAGIN & MARTIN LITTLE 
Τ h e For s a k e n F a m i 1 i. e s : The Effect s o f U n e m ρ Ι o y m e n t 
on Family Life, Penguin, 1984. 
Psychiatrists' analysis of effect, of unemployment on family 
rather that individual life. Stress that effects differ 
a c c o r ding to life c y c 1 e point of family (i.e. if fain i 1 y 
undergoing transition from one stage to another in family life 
cycle, they are likely to suffer more from effects of 
unemployment). Little statistical information. Useful for case 
studies it details; on qualitative rather than quantitative 
basis only. 
[37] D .FAUSTO 
Il sistema italiano di sicurezza sociale, Il Milino 
Bologna, 1978. 
This book explains the essential elements of the Italian 
social security system. The system requires substantial 
structural reforms to overcome the crisis point which Italian 
society has reached. Diverse conceptions of social security 
are examined as well as the problems involved in provision of 
social insurance, health care and general assistance. The 
Italian system of assistance is compared with the systems 
operating in other EEC countries and the future prospects of 
the Italian system are assessed. 
[38J M. FELDSTEIN 
The Private and Social Costs of Unemployment. 
American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No 2, May 1978, 
pp. 155-158. 
12 
Private: experience differs very significantly from one 
.individual to another. Claims low private cost, due to high 
marginal tax rate and no tax on unemployment "implies that 
unemployment benefits replace a very high fraction of lost net 
income, typically about two thirds". Maintains that American 
system of taxes and transfers drastically lowers the relative 
private cost, of unemployment and thereby induces a higher 
unemployment rate. 
Social : Raises issue of layoffs - states that the social costs 
must be judged by considering the specific policy by which a 
worker would be re-employed. 
C39] FORBES, J.F & A. McGREGOR 
"Unemployment and Mortality in Post. War Scotland" , 
Journal of Health Economics, 3, 1984, pp.239-257. 
An econometric study which finds a positive relation between 
age specific mortality rates and unemployment (current and 
lagged) in Scotland. 
|4 0] FRANZ, W. arid H. KÖNIG 
"Nature and Causes of Unemployment in the Federal 
Republic of Germany since the Seventies: An 
Empirical Investigation". Conference on the Rise in 
Unemployment, White House Conference Centre, 
Chelwood Gate, Sussex,27-31 May, 1985. 
Paper reviews evidence for W.German labour market and outlines 
the problem of declining employment, increased participation 
rates for married women and increased unemployment rates 
especially for the young and for foreign workers. Analyses the 
dynamics of unemployment (inflows and outflows) and finds 
duration of those not receiving unemployment benefits 
(arbeitslosengeld)is greater than those receiving them. 
Estimates labour demand functions (for persons and hours) and 
finds unemployment is due to normal wages being too high and 
overtime rates too low. 
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[4l] LJFREY 
Economia Italiana e costo del lavoro7 Coinés, Rome 
1977 (Original source unaavai lable - findings taken 
from seco ri cj a r y s o u r c e ) 
According to the author a distinction must, be made between the 
"explicit supply of labour", i.e. the official labour force 
and the "effective supply", including persons in casual and 
discontinuous forms of employment. The 1973 labour force was 
estimated at 35.5% of the total population but Frey calculated 
that the efffee tive supply was equal to 44%. A further 
percentage needs to be added to include those who currently do 
not offer themselves on the labour market, but would do so if 
conditions improved. 
[42J L. GALLINO 
"Politieel dell' occupazione e seconda professione", 
Economia & Lavoro, No. 1, 1975, pp. 81-95. 
This article examines two features of the Italian labour-
market, the "guaranteed job" system and double job holding. 
Many positions offer job security, health insurance, a steady 
modest, salary, a good pension and low official hours. Because 
of these advantages, people with such positions, when looking 
for a second job, have a wider choice than the wholly 
unemployed, who are usually searching for a secure main job. 
The characteristics of only those second jobs which provide at 
least as much income as primary occupations are examined. 
Suggestions for future research and data provision are made. 
[43J GARONNA, Paolo 
"The Theory and Practice of Employment Policy in 
Italy in the Seven ties",in Job Creation and Job 
Maintenance - Experience from Western Countries in 
the 1970s (Eds.) F.But.tier, K. Gerlach and 
W.Sengenberger (Arbeitskreis Sozialwissenschaf tlieh 
Arbeitsmarktforschung (SAMF), University of 
Paderborn, Sep. 1980). 
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Growth of unemployment mainly of young and university 
graduates, importance of labour hoarding and internal labour-
markets to explain cyclical movements in productivity. 
Discusses importance of Cassa Integrazione Guadagi (CIG). Most 
important cause of unemploymen t is decline in aggregate 
demand. 
& 4] GARONNA,P. (1983) 
"On the Heterogeneity and Instability of Italian 
Segmentation Classification Criteria". Rivista 
Internazionale di Scienze Economiche e Commerciali. 
Anno XXX N12, Dee. 1983 
Discusses segmentation hypothesis for Italian labour market. 
From estimates of employment functions for the manufacturing 
sector he finds increasing rigidity of the labour market. 
L45] P-GARONNA 
(University of Padua) "Youth Unemployment, Labour-
Market Flexibility and Union Strategies in Italy" 
Conference on Youth Pay and Recruitment Practices. 
Farnham Castle, Surrey, June 1985. 
This paper analyses recent, changes in youth unemployment. It 
points out. that the drop in the number of first job seekers in 
1984 did not cause a drop in youth unemloyment, because more 
young people were included in the total of unemployed who had 
lost a previous job. This has partly resulted from new 
measures to deregulate the labour market for young people, 
started in 1977 and revised in 1983, the revised measures 
being more efffeetive. The author suggests a better solution 
to the problem of youth unemployment would entail 
internationally coordinated economic recovery programmes and 
greater worker participation in employment decisions. 
[46] M.V.GINNEKEN & M.GARZUEL 
Unemployment in France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands: a Survey of Trends, 
Causes and Policy Options. ILO, Geneva. 
15 
Describe the trends in unemployment and discuss some 
explanations for its growth. Discuss earnings, earnings 
differentials and income distribution. 
[4 '7] GODLEY, W.A.H &_ J ._ R .__ _SHE ΡΉ ER D 
Long Term Growth and Short Term Policy. NIER, August. 
1964. pp. 26-38. 
An early paper trying to relate employment and unemployment to 
productive potential using GB data. Emphasise lagged 
a d j ustmeη t of emρ1oy meη t to ou tput. 
&Õ] BPJBERLJlJiO^DON 
Unemployment and Potential Output in the 1980's. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2: 1984, pp. 
537­564. 
Uses Okun's Law method to explain rapid decline in US 
unemployment in the 1980s. A sophisticated analysis which 
estimates equations for employment, participation rates, 
hours, allowing for changes in trends. Estimates equations up 
to .1.979 and then simulates for the 1980s. 
[49] GRAVELLE, H .3 .E . 
"Editorial: Time Series Analysis of Mortality and 
Unemployment", Journal of Health Economics,3,1984, 
pp. 297­305. 
An important contribution to problems of specification of time 
series econometric modelling of the relationship between 
mortality and unemployment. 
[50] H.S.E. GRAVELLE, G. HUTCHINSON, J .STERN 
Mortality and Unemployment: a Critique of Brenner's 
Time Series Analyses. The Lancet, Sept. 26, 1981. 
ρρ. 675­679. 
They argue that Brenner's (1979) time series model is 
incorrectly specified,, the data are not very good and that 
the results are a statistical artifact due to choice of 
period. 
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& 9 HAK IM.C 
"The Social Consequences of High Unemployment". 
Jou mal of Social Policy. Vol. 11, no. 4, 1982. pp. 
433-67. 
[52J R.HARRISON 
The Demoralising Experience of Prolonged 
Unemployment. Dept. of Employment Gazette, pp. 339-
348, April 1976. 
A review of the literature on social psychological aspects of 
unemployment. Emphasises the sequence of responses: shocks 
optimism pessimism fatalism. 
[53] J AHOPA, MARIE 
Employment & Unemployment: A Social-Psychological 
Analysis, C.U.P. Cambridge 1982. 
Discusses the destructive aspects of unemployment and argues 
that these are just as severe now as in the nineteen thirties. 
Emphasises the importance of employment in providing social-
psychological support to the individual. 
[54J J. M.M.HILL 
The Social and Psychological Impact of Unemployment: 
a Pilot Study. Tavistock Institute of Human 
Relations. April 1977. 
An investigation using interview techniques in London and 
Merseyside. Find inter alia that job loss leads to social 
isolation. Observe a sequence of feelings with duration of 
unemployment. A job provides economic and psychological 
support. 
[55) M.J.HILL, R.M.HARRISON, A.V.SARGEANT & V.TALBOT 
Men Out of Work: a study of Unemployment in Three 
Towns, Cambridge, C.U.P, 1973. 
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[56J HOUSE OF LORDS 
Written Answers 
Unemployment: The Cost to the Exchequer, 1.2 Nov. 1980 
D7] HOUSE OF LORDS 
Written Answers 
Unemployment: Morbidity and Mortality Rates, 13 Nov. 
1980. 
C5 ä HOUSE OF LORDS 
Report of Select. Committee on Unemployment, Vol.1, 
10 May 1982, London UMSO. 
[59J J.J.HUGHES & R.PERLMAN 
The Economics of Unemployment, Ha r νes t e r, 1984. 
ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics, International 
Labour Office, Geneva. 
A textbook which looks at the UK and US experience. Has a 
chapter reviewing the costs of unemployment ­ economic, fiscal 
and individual. 
[6OJ ILO 
Social security for the unemployed, International 
Labour Office, Geneva, 1976. 
This study describes the existing unemployment protection 
measures in member states of the ILO, together with an 
exposition and evaluation of the current situation. The 
latest, trends are discussed and the emerging problems which 
governments are having to face in this vital area of social 
security are examined. 
18 
[ó l ] M. JAHOPA, H.RUSH 
Work, Employment and Unemployment, University of 
Sussex Science Policy Research Unit Occasional Paper 
No. 12, 1980. 
[62] JOHN, J 
"Economic Instability and Mortality in the Federal 
Republic of Germany" in J. John, D. Schwefel & H. 
Zollner (eds.) Influence of Economic Instability on 
Health. Sprinzer Verlag, Berlin 1983. 
Provides some preliminary results which find a positive 
relation between mortality and unemployment using time series 
data on West Germany. 
19 
C6 3J JOHN, J., D .SCHWEFEL, and H. ZOLLNER (eds) 
Influence of Economic Instability on Jjejal_th_ Vol. 21 
1° Lecture Notes in Medical Informatics Ed. by 
D.A.B.Lindberg and P.L.Reichertz, Springer Verlag, 
Berlin, 1983. 
Several interesting papers by Brenner, John, Brinkman,Fagin ét­
al, which review aggregate and micro (individual level) 
studies. 
t 4 ] G.E.JOHNSON & P. R. G .LAYARD 
The Natural Rate of Unemployment: Explanation and 
Policy .Centre for Labour Economics, Discussion Paper-
No. 206, October 1984. 
Surveys the theories behind an "equilibrium" or "natural" rate 
of unemployment and how policies might alter it. Consider how 
natural rates have changed in Europe using empirical models. 
[6 5j P.N.JUNANKAR 
"The Relationship between Investment and Spare 
Capacity in the UK,1957-66", Economica, August. 1970, 
pp. 277-292. 
An econometric study of Investment in the UK that compares 
different models. It argues that spare capacity in the economy 
is injurious to investment and hence growth. 
[66] P.N.JUNANKAR 
"The Political Economy of Unemployment: Causes and 
Consequences", Political Quarterly, Vol. 56 No. 1, 
Jan-Mar 1985 pp. 56-67. 
20 
The paper evaluates the cost and benefits of unemployment: to 
different individuals and classes in society. Argues that 
unemployment weakens the bargaining power of the workers and 
strengthens that, of the capitalists. Although unemployment 
imposes heavy costs, it provides an occasion for a 
rejuvenation of capitalism. 
[ó 7] P.N.JUNANKAR 
"Youth Unemployment and Youth Crime: a Preliminary 
Analysis", Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
Australian National University Discussion Paper-
No. 106, August 1984. 
Using data on England and Wales the author finds some support 
for the hypothesis that unemployment is associated with crime. 
L68J P.N.JUNANKAR & A.J.NEALE 
Relative Wages and the Youth Labour Market, 
Institute for Employment Research, University of 
Warwick, Discussion Paper No. 29, Jan. 1985 to be 
published in School to Unemployment? The Labour-
Market for Young People,(ed) P.N.Junankar, 
Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Surveys the evidence on the relationship between youth pay and 
employment. Using a disequilibrium model finds very little 
evidence for explaining youth unemployment by increased pay. 
[69] P. KELVIN & J.JARRETT 
Unemployment: Its Social Psychological Effects, (CUP 
forthcoming). 
A thorough survey of the social-psychological aspects of 
unemployment. Contains a detailed bibliography. 
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&θ] M. LAGRAVE 
"Les difficultés d'évaluation du coût du chômage" 
Revue Française des Affairas Sociales J an ua r y­Ma r c h 
1 QO~< 
A succinct account of the fiscal costs of unemployment in 
France. 
[71] LAYARD, R & S. NICKELL 
"The Causes of British Unemployment", National 
Institute Economic Review No. Ill, Feb. 1985, pp. 62·· 
o.J . 
Develop a structural macroeconomic model for GB. They find 
that demand factors are the main reason for the growth of 
unemployment. 
[7Ì] R.E.LUCAS & T.J.SARGENT (eds.) 
Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, 
London: Allen & Unwin 1981. 
A series of papers which present, the New Classical Economics 
where Governments are impotent in a world with perfectly 
functioning markets and with people who hold rational 
expectations. 
[73] MALINVAUD, E 
"The Rise of Unemployment in France", Conference on 
the Rise in Unemployment, White House Conference 
Centre, Chelwwood Gate, Sussex, 27­31 May, 1985. 
Main explanation for growth of Unemployment is the 
international recession., Increased real labour costs and 
decreased labour market, flexibility are also partly 
responsible. Questions the use of Phillips curves estimaates 
to obtain estimates of NAIRU. Discusses the importance 
ofsocio-political factors."We may say that some of the 
presently unemployed now pay the price of what, had to be done 
[in May 1968] in order to maintain the cohesion of French 
society. . . " . 
[74] MANPOWER SERVICES COMMISSION 
Review of the Services for the Unemployed, London, 
MSC, 1981. 
Discusses the Costs of Unemployment for Britain, describes the 
unemployment trends and various labour market policies. Find 
the output loss costs in 1979 to be 4% of GDP for the UK. 
Stress the importance of work to individuals for social 
psychological reasons. 
[75J I.F.MARIANI 
"Youth wages and enterprise recruitment practices: 
the Italian experience", Conference paper presented 
at Conference on Youth Pay and Recruitment Practices 
for Young Workers in Western Europe, Farnham Castle, 
Surrey, June 1985. 
Minimum wage agreements negotiated in the late 1960's have 
largely eliminated wage differentials between youths and 
adults in jobs at. the same grade, although on average youths 
earn less because relatively more are in lower grades. 
However, widening differentials would be unlikely to help the 
chronic youth unemployment that exists in Italy. Measures in 
.1.977 which introduced a subsidy for firms taking on qualified 
young people, without toeing able to choose which ones, from a 
special unemployment, register were largely unsuccessful. 
However, a new law in 1983 which allowed firms to choose which 
young people to employ, on fixed term contracts, was much more 
successful. This law only operated for a trial period of one 
year ,and new rules introduced in 1984 were more restrictive 
and bureaucratic and less succcessful. Evidence shows that, 
although wage levels do matter, firms would prefer to take on 
workers without, restrictive employment contracts and to be 
free to vary lengths of service, hours of work, job 
specifications and avoid bureaucratic interference. 
[76] E.MASSACESI and M .GRAZIA FINSI 
"The Labour Market in Italy"»Review of Economic 
Conditions in Italy, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, May 1977, pp. 
117-136. 
This article examines various factors that, may distort the 
officially recorded labour force figures. Historical trends in 
economic activity rates and unemployment are compared with 
other countries and the influences on the Italian situation of 
changing industrial structure, in particular the decline of 
agriculture and rise of the service sector, and emigration, 
are considered. The extent of the black economy and double 
job holding are assessed. The effects of restrictive 
employment legislation and the rigidity of the labour market, 
and the problem of "intellectual unemployment" are also 
studied. Some proposals for reform of the labour market, are 
put forward. 
C77] METCALF David 
"On the Measurement of Employment and Unemployment", 
National Inst.Economic Review, No. 109, Aug. 18, 
1984. 
Discusses problems of measurement of unemployment, estimates 
of long run (natural rates) unemployment and argues that 
macroeconomic policy is to blame for the growth of 
unemployment in the UK. 
[78J MODIGLIANI, F., F. PAPPA SCHIOPPA & N.ROSSI 
"Unemployment in Italy: 1960-1983", Conference on 
the Rise in Unemployment, Chelwood Gate, Sussex, 27-
31 May 1985. 
Discusses institutional aspects of Ital 
(including the Cassa Integrazione Guada 
monopolistic competition macroeconomic 
aspects of the labour market. Results i 
of rigidity of labour market, decrease 
unemployment in the 80s, significant ef 
costs, increase in mismatch, etc. 
After briefly reviewing the main charac 
Italian labour market, a highly aggregat, 
is developed and used to investigate th 
unemployment. The frictional component 
been substantial arid has varied over ti 
pattern of demand (net of labour augmen 
progress) has influenced the increase i 
i an Labour Market, 
gni). Uses a 
model to simulate 
nclude support for view 
in non-ffictional 
fee t. s of real labour 
teristics of the 
ed mac r oec on om i e mode1 
e nature of Italian 
of unemployment has 
me and the temporal 
ting technical 
n non-frictional 
unemployment in the last decade. The most, interesting result, 
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